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PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS: FROM PREVENTING 
GENETIC DISEASE TO CUSTOMIZING CHILDREN.  CAN THE 
TECHNOLOGY BE REGULATED BASED ON THE PARENTS’ 
INTENT? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, Coumbia Pictures released the motion picture Gattaca.  The film, 
set in the “not too distant future,” depicted a society in which parents used 
technology to select every possible trait for their children before the children 
were born.1  One of the most memorable lines from the movie is, “People used 
to say that a child conceived in love has a better chance of happiness.  They 
don’t say that anymore.”2  Instead, children who were born without the benefit 
of such technology were referred to as “degenerates” and faced 
discrimination.3  Although we do not yet live in such a society, a recent 
advance in genetic and reproductive technology, called preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (“PGD”), has led to the following scenarios. 
Scenario One: Imagine yourself in the position of Colorado couple Jack 
and Lisa Nash, who learned that their daughter, Molly, had been diagnosed 
with the rare and deadly genetic disease Fanconi’s anemia4 and was likely to 
die by age seven.5  The desperate parents were willing to do whatever was 
necessary to save her life, but Molly was an only child and the best treatment 
 
 1. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  Ethan Hawke plays the main character in the film.  He was the first child in his 
family and was born without the benefit of the technology.  After he was born with a genetic heart 
condition, his parents used the technology before the birth of their second child.  A poignant 
moment occurs when Hawke’s character says, “I’ll never understand what possessed my mother 
to put her faith in God’s hands, rather than the local geneticist.”  Id. 
 4. Fanconi’s anemia is defined as “a rare, usually congenital disorder transmitted as an 
autosomal-recessive trait, characterized by aplastic anemia in childhood or early adult life, bone 
abnormalities, chromatin breaks, and developmental anomalies.  Children begin to show 
symptoms between 4 and 12 years of age.”  MOSBY’S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 
DICTIONARY 615 (5th ed. 1998); see also Susan M. Wolf et al., Using Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 
328 (2003) (describing Fanconi’s anemia as a “rare fatal disorder that is associated with bone 
marrow failure, leukemia, and marked cancer predisposition and is inherited in an autosomal 
recessive fashion”). 
 5. Rick Weiss, Test-Tube Baby Born to Save Ill Sister: Genetic Selection by Colorado 
Parents May Herald an Era, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at A1. 
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would be to replace her faulty bone marrow cells with the healthy cells of a 
perfectly-matched sibling.6  To save Molly, the Nashes used in-vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”)7 and PGD to conceive another child who would be a 
healthy and Human-Leukocyte Antigen (“HLA”) tissue-matched donor.8  With 
PGD, researchers test a single cell for a genetic disorder from embryos created 
through standard IVF and implant only those cells that are free of the disorder 
into the woman’s uterus.9  In the Nash case, two of fifteen embryos were 
perfect tissue matches after several attempts, but only one was healthy enough 
to be transferred into Lisa’s womb.10  Fortunately, that embryo implanted 
properly, and baby Adam was born on August 29, 2000.11  After Adam was 
born, doctors saved the blood cells from his umbilical cord and infused them 
into Molly’s circulatory system approximately one month later.12  As of 2003, 
the transplant had succeeded, as Molly’s hematopoietic and immune systems 
were normal three years after the procedure had taken place.13 
Scenario Two: Next imagine yourself in the position of California couple 
Jeffrey and Melanie Sowers.  Shortly after the couple’s first child was born, 
Jeffrey was diagnosed with myotonic dystrophy, a common form of muscular 
dystrophy.14  The Sowers wanted another child, but did not want to risk the 50 
percent chance that their children could also get the debilitating disease.15  
When the couple learned of PGD, Mrs. Sowers began the procedure to avoid 
 
 6. Id.; see Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 328 (noting that hematopoietic stem cell transplant is 
the only therapeutic approach with proven success in reversing the bone marrow complications of 
Fanconi’s anemia.  The morbidity and mortality associated with this kind of transplant are 
substantially lower when using a sibling donor who is Human-Leukocyte Antigen (“HLA”) 
tissue-matched to the ill child, as compared to an unrelated donor.). 
 7. IVF is defined as 
a method of fertilizing human ova outside the body by collecting the mature ova and 
placing them in a dish with a sample of spermatozoa.  After an incubation period of 48 to 
72 hours, the fertilized ova are injected into the uterus through the cervix.  The procedure 
takes from 2 to 3 days. 
MOSBY’S, supra note 4, at 870. 
 8. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 328. 
 9. For a simple overview of PGD, see generally Bonnie Steinbock, Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis and Embryo Selection, in A COMPANION TO GENETHICS 175 (Justine Burley 
& John Harris eds., 2002). 
 10. Weiss, supra note 5, at A1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  Umbilical cells are used because “[r]esearch has shown that [these cells] . . . can 
travel to a recipient’s bone marrow and repopulate the marrow space with healthy cells.”  Id. 
 13. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 328. 
 14. Amy Dockser Marcus, Ensuring Baby Will Be Healthy: Embryo’s Screening Gains in 
Popularity, Controversy; Choosing A Child’s Gender, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 26, 2002, at N3, 
available at 2002 WL-WSJE 22218003. 
 15. Id. 
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passing on the genetic disease to any future children.16  PGD is widely used by 
couples who know that they have a risk of passing along diseases such as Tay-
Sach’s, hemophilia, Gaucher’s disease, sickle cell disease, Huntington’s, and 
other genetic conditions.17  The couples use PGD to detect those embryos that 
carry the genetic illness. 
Scenario Three: Finally, imagine yourself in the position of a couple that 
chooses to use PGD for a non-medical purpose that is not described above.  
Suppose you already have three boys, and would like to guarantee that your 
next child is a girl, or vice versa.  You might also want to attempt to give your 
child every possible advantage; so you use PGD to select for traits such as 
intelligence, athletic ability, or musical inclination.  PGD could be used in such 
a way that will allow parents the unprecedented ability to choose the traits of 
their children, for any reason or no reason at all.18 
This Comment will address the various ways that PGD can be used and 
examine how the technology is being regulated internationally.  To date, the 
United States has not adopted any sort of regulation or control over the 
procedure.  Section II traces the development of PGD and discusses the 
controversies surrounding both the therapeutic and non-therapeutic uses of the 
technology.  Section III examines how other countries regulate PGD and 
assisted reproductive technologies (“ARTs”).  Section IV considers whether 
the United States can create legislation that regulates PGD and authorizes its 
use for only medical and therapeutic purposes, such as the first two scenarios 
described above.  This Comment argues that, despite the value given to 
procreative liberty in this country, the United States must implement such 
legislation and that it is permissible to do so based on the couple’s intent and 
purpose in obtaining the procedure. 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.; see also Richard J. Tasca & Michael E. McClure, The Emerging Technology and 
Application of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 7, 7 (1998). 
 18. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE 
FUTURE OF SOCIETY 2 (2003) (“Genetic tests will soon be developed that can identify embryos or 
fetuses not just with genetic abnormalities, but with desirable physical or mental traits, enabling 
parents to decide which ones to implant in the womb or bring to term.”); see also FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 
75 (2002) (noting that the first step toward giving parents greater control over their children’s 
genetic makeup will come from PGD.  “In the future it should be routinely possible for parents to 
have their embryos automatically screened for a wide variety of disorders, and those with the 
‘right’ genes implanted in the mother’s womb.”). 
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II.  THE BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENT, AND ETHICS OF PGD 
A. Brief Background of the Technology 
PGD was first performed in 1989 and was used to avoid creating a child 
inflicted with a genetics-based disorder.19  PGD has since been successfully 
applied to a variety of genetic diseases, either single gene disorders or 
chromosomal abnormalities.20  Before PGD was used, prenatal testing was 
performed during the first trimester by using chorionic villus sampling,21 by 
ultrasound,22 or by amniocentesis.23  PGD is most commonly used by couples 
who have had one child affected with a genetic disorder and/or one or more 
termination(s) of pregnancy following the conventional testing described 
above.24  PGD reduces the chance that parents will be faced with the difficult 
decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy by preventing gestation of 
affected embryos.25  The possibility of saving a couple from enduring a series 
of terminated pregnancies is an obvious advantage of PGD.26  The terminations 
can be very physically and psychologically stressful because “each aborted 
fetus is potentially a wanted child.”27  PGD allows couples to create their 
family with increased confidence that they will neither give birth to an affected 
child nor subject themselves to the chance of having to terminate a 
pregnancy.28 
 
 19. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 327. 
 20. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Fact Sheet: Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis (Dec. 1996), at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/PGD-Fact.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2004) [hereinafter ASRM Fact Sheet].  The American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (“ASRM”) notes that PGD can now detect Cystic Fibrosis, Fragile X syndrome, Down 
syndrome, Tay-Sachs disease, and Hemophilia A, among others.  Id. 
 21. Chorionic villus sampling is defined as a 
sampling of chorionic villi from the villous areas of the chorion, a procedure used for 
prenatal diagnosis at nine to 12 weeks of gestation.  A catheter is inserted either through 
the cervix or through the abdominal wall and fetal chorionic villus tissue for analysis is 
aspirated under ultrasonic guidance.  This has been used for the prenatal diagnosis of fetal 
trisomies, hemoglobinopathies, and biochemical disorders.  It allows first trimester 
diagnosis and direct chromosomal and biochemical analysis but does not screen for neural 
tube defects or certain other anomalies; some of those may be identified by maternal 
serum and amniotic fluid alphafetoprotein measurements. 
MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 
1578–79 (7th ed. 2003). 
 22. Ultrasound is defined as “sound waves at the very high frequency of over 20,000 kHz 
(vibrations per second).  Ultrasound has many medical applications, including fetal monitoring, 
imaging of internal organs, and, at an extremely high frequency, the cleaning of dental and 
surgical instruments.”  MOSBY’S, supra note 4, at 1672. 
 23. Jason Christopher Roberts, Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis and the Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 12, 7 (2002), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/ 
2002dltr0012.html.  Amniocentesis is defined as 
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PGD allows dissection and testing of a single cell from an eight-cell 
embryo.29  The process involves ovarian hyperstimulation, oocyte (egg) 
retrieval, and IVF.30  Forty-eight to seventy-two hours later, the embryo 
usually consists of six to ten cells called blastomeres.31  A blastomere (single 
cell) is then removed through a biopsy and DNA is extracted, amplified by 
polymerase chain reaction, and analyzed.32 
A diagnosis is typically obtained within twenty-four hours, and only the 
unaffected embryos are transferred into the woman’s uterus, with the hopes of 
initiating pregnancy.33  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(“ASRM”) cautions that not all disorders can be diagnosed by PGD.34  It is 
imperative that parents understand that PGD “does not guarantee that the child 
will be free of [all] genetic or congenital conditions.”35  PGD can only verify 
that the child will be free of conditions for which testing is done.36  Although 
 
an obstetric procedure in which a small amount of amniotic fluid is removed for 
laboratory analysis.  It is usually performed between the sixteenth and twentieth weeks of 
gestation to aid in the diagnosis of fetal abnormalities. . . . With the use of ultrasound 
scanning techniques the position of the fetus and the location of the placenta are 
determined.  The skin on the mother’s abdomen is aseptically prepared, and a local 
anesthetic is usually injected.  A needle attached to a syringe is introduced into a part of 
the uterus where there is the least chance of perforating the placenta or scratching the 
fetus. 
MOSBY’S, supra note 4, at 75–76. 
 24. Heather Draper & Ruth Chadwick, Beware! Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis May 
Solve Some Old Problems but It Also Raises New Ones, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 114, 114 (1999). 
 25. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 327; see also Tasca & McClure, supra note 17, at 7 (noting 
that couples who only use chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis are more likely to decide 
whether to abort a fetus at a more advanced developmental stage). 
 26. Draper & Chadwick, supra note 24, at 114. 
 27. Id.  But see Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 17, 20 (1998).  Botkin states that the psychological 
reactions to PGD remain to be evaluated.  Id.  While PGD is not anticipated to carry the same 
psychological effects associated with miscarriages or other losses, there are still questions to 
consider.  Id.  Such issues include the psychological implications of going through IVF and then 
discarding affected embryos, whether women think about the children that might have been, and 
whether the embryos become lost children in the couple’s minds with time.  Id. 
 28. Draper & Chadwick, supra note 24, at 114. 
 29. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 328. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. ASRM Fact Sheet, supra note 20. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Botkin, supra note 27, at 19.  The author describes such a child as a “perfect” baby.  Id.  
PGD is not useful for predicting congenital diseases because these malformations “do not have 
their origins in single-gene defects or in detectable chromosomal aberrations.”  Id. 
 36. Id. (also noting that PGD alone will not reduce the risk of offspring with conditions such 
as spina bifida, anencephaly, hypoplastic left heart, renal agenesis, and other conditions because 
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PGD has helped many families and has ensured the health of both future and 
existing children, the technology is not perfect.  Mistakes in diagnosis have 
occurred, including one highly-publicized case where parents sued the 
institution where they underwent PGD after their child was born with cystic 
fibrosis.37 
B. General Opposition to PGD 
1. Concern of Oppressing People with Disabilities 
There is opposition to PGD because it identifies and discards embryos that 
are affected by a genetic disease.38  Yet, couples do not use PGD simply to be 
informed about the genetic nature of their embryos; the explicit purpose for 
most couples is to transfer healthy embryos to the woman and discard those 
determined to be affected with unwanted diseases.39  Prenatal diagnosis in 
general is criticized because it sends a message of rejection to people with 
disabilities and could lead to decreased tolerance of disability and could 
encourage embryos and fetuses with disabilities to be eliminated rather than 
welcomed into the world.40  Some fear that parental reproductive decisions will 
be influenced by the “key social pressure” of oppressing people with 
disabilities.41  Able-bodied people may receive negative images of people with 
disabilities and can be generally misinformed about what their lives are like.42  
 
the malformations in these conditions often do not have their origins in single-gene defects or in 
detectable chromosomal aberrations); see also Genetics and Public Policy Center, Berman 
Bioethics Institute, John Hopkins University, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: A Discussion 
of Challenges, Concerns, and Preliminary Policy Options Related to the Genetic Testing of 
Human Embryos, 6 (2004), at http://www.dnapolicy.org/downloads/pdfs/policy-pgd.pdf 
[hereinafter A Discussion of Challenges] (noting that it is recommended that PGD results be 
confirmed by subsequent prenatal tests because errors can be made when testing the embryos). 
 37. See Doe v. Illinois Masonic Med. Ctr., 696 N.E.2d 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (rejecting the 
parents’ claim of “loss of consortium” and the child’s claim of “wrongful life” and ultimately 
concluding that the defendants could not be held legally liable). 
 38. See generally Steinbock, supra note 9, at 178–81.  “PGD and embryo selection, just as 
much as prenatal diagnosis and abortion, imply that it is better that children who have disabilities 
are not born.”  Id. at 180. 
 39. Botkin, supra note 27, at 19. 
 40. Id. at 22; see also Draper & Chadwick, supra note 24, at 115 (questioning whether we 
should “eradicat[e] difference or intolerance to indifference”); Steinbock, supra note 9, at 178 
(noting that a primary aim of prenatal diagnosis is the avoidance of a child with a disability). 
 41. David S. King, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and the ‘New’ Eugenics, 25 J. MED. 
ETHICS 176, 178 (1999).  Parents are likely to select offspring that conform best to social norms 
regarding health, physical ability, appearance, and aptitude.  Id. at 181. 
 42. Id. at 178 (noting that genetic counselors rarely put potential parents in contact with 
people who actually are affected by the particular disorder in question); see also Steinbock, supra 
note 9, at 180 (“Disability rights activists have performed a much-needed service in making the 
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Furthermore, parents are acutely aware of the more material aspects of 
disability oppression, such as insufficient welfare provisions, lack of access, 
discrimination, and increased financial burdens.43  These social pressures can 
result in a systematic bias against the birth of genetically-disabled children.44 
Advocates for the disabled do not want to send a message that a life with a 
disability is not worth living at all or that these traits are inferior.45  Advocates 
of PGD counter that the severity of disorders and disabilities are very different, 
as some people who are affected have little cognitive ability and are unable to 
understand their situation.46  Thus, couples may want to use PGD to prevent 
their future children from such suffering.  There is speculation that continuing 
a pregnancy with an affected embryo could be abolished because most people 
would not want to implant an embryo that will develop into a child with a 
genetic disorder.47 
2. Opposition from Anti-Abortion Activists 
One of the most common arguments against using PGD to screen for 
serious genetic diseases is related to the moral status of the embryo.48  There 
are several different views as to the moral status of the human embryo and 
fetus: 
 
larger community aware that most people with disabilities find their lives rewarding and 
worthwhile.”). 
 43. King, supra note 41, at 178. 
 44. Id. (characterizing this bias as “eugenic” and noting that the purpose of PGD is eugenic 
because its aim is to reduce the number of births of children with congenital and genetic 
disorders). 
 45. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 13; see also Steinbock, supra note 9, at 179 (noting that 
disability rights advocates claim that many disabilities are largely socially constructed and 
therefore “[t]he appropriate response is to change society’s attitude toward disability, not to try to 
get rid of disabled individuals”).  These activists also emphasize that not all disabilities are 
detected by prenatal screening.  Id.  “As long as there are going to be people with disabilities, it is 
argued, an attitude of inclusion is better than an attitude of removal.”  Id. 
 46. Rebecca Knox, Comment, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Disease Control or Child 
Objectification?, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 435, 440 (2003). 
 47. King, supra note 41, at 180; see also Steinbock, supra note 9, at 179 (suggesting that 
prenatal screening increases intolerance of imperfection by leading parents to expect a “perfect 
baby”).  But see Botkin, supra note 27, at 23 (“Current experience indicates that society can 
simultaneously promote respect and opportunity for the disabled while enabling couples to 
prevent the birth of a disabled child through prenatal diagnosis.”).  Botkin also notes, however, 
that distinctions may be made between those disabled from genetic conditions that can be 
detected prenatally and the disabled who have limitations from other causes, such as injury, 
stroke, or infection.  Id.  Because PGD can select genetic characteristics of future children, it 
could promote societal expectations of perfect children, thus creating a more narrow intolerance 
of those disabled due to genetic conditions and possibly of the parents who choose to have such a 
child.  Id. 
 48. Roberts, supra note 23, at 10. 
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‘Pro-Life’: The embryo-fetus has full moral status, equal to that of any adult 
human, from the moment of conception; or 
‘Pro-Choice’: The embryo-fetus has no intrinsic moral status . . . . Such status 
is only acquired at birth or even beyond and, when acquired, is acquired to the 
full extent possible.  Until then, any moral status the embryo-fetus has is 
derived indirectly from the moral status of those with intrinsic moral status; or 
‘Compromise’: The embryo-fetus has, to begin with, a minimal intrinsic moral 
status, which increases with its development during gestation.  Full moral 
status is, however, achieved only at birth or beyond.49 
Under the “pro-life view,” there is no distinction between discarding an 
embryo and aborting a fetus, as both are morally unacceptable.50  Strict 
proponents of the pro-life view may actually find PGD more ethically 
troubling and problematic than traditional prenatal diagnosis because PGD 
creates numerous embryos and thus the loss of prenatal life can be greater than 
if couples had opted for traditional prenatal diagnosis and selective termination 
of pregnancy.51  Under the “pro-choice view,” fetuses and embryos are “equal 
in their lack of significant moral standing.”52  Commentators who adopt the 
“compromise view” disagree over whether development is a seamless 
continuum, with the moral status increasing incrementally with development, 
or if moral status is based on the achievement of milestones in the 
developmental process that have particular moral significance.53 
Advocates for PGD emphasize that the preliminary screening reduces the 
number of abortions, a procedure that carries “greater medical and emotional 
consequences.”54  They argue that much of society adopts the view that the 
fetus has greater moral standing than does the preimplantation embryo.55  The 
 
 49. Deryck Beyleveld, The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus, in THE ETHICS OF 
GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 59 (Hille Haker & Deryck Beyleveld eds., 2000) (applying 
the moral theory of Alan Gewirth in ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978)).  
Beyleveld notes that these views are “extreme positions” and that the use of these labels in public 
discourse may not be as uncompromising.  Beyleveld, supra, at 78 n.2. 
 50. Botkin, supra note 27, at 20; see also Draper & Chadwick, supra note 24, at 114–15.  
“[M]orally significant human life begins at conception.”  Id. at 114.  This view might prevent the 
embryo from being implanted or allow termination of a pregnancy if it was shown that it was in 
its best interests, provided that its life is not worth living.  Id. at 115. 
 51. Botkin, supra note 27, at 21. 
 52. Id. at 20; see also Draper & Chadwick, supra note 24, at 114 (noting that many view 
failing to implant an embryo as morally preferable to killing a more fully developed fetus).  They 
believe that the embryo acquires greater moral status as it develops toward viability.  Id. 
 53. Botkin, supra note 27, at 20.  Botkin notes that the developmental milestones include 
“formation of the primitive streak at 14 days, ‘quickening’ at about 18 weeks, development of 
‘brain life’ at about 20 to 22 weeks, a sapient or sentient state emerging at about 22 to 24 weeks, 
and viability at 23 to 24 weeks of gestation.”  Id. at 20–21. 
 54. Roberts, supra note 23, at 10. 
 55. Botkin, supra note 27, at 21. 
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wide acceptance of this view means that a couple’s preference of discarding an 
embryo rather than terminating a fetus is ethically justified.56 
3. Fear That Access to the Technology Will Be Limited 
PGD also raises concerns about access to the technology.  The substantial 
cost of PGD is not affordable for most couples, and insurance and government 
programs are not likely to cover the costs of PGD because other existing 
methods of prenatal diagnosis are less expensive.57  If PGD were to become 
commercially available on a broad scale, it would likely be used almost 
exclusively by wealthy couples.58  There is a discrepancy between urban white 
women versus rural and other women in the United States in the use of 
prenatal diagnosis.59  Some fear that a social divide will be created where the 
rich suffer from fewer genetic diseases than the poor.60  There is also 
speculation that insurance companies may someday offer discounts to families 
who do use PGD and will penalize families who do not use it.61 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 25; see also A Discussion of Challenges, supra note 36, at 22 (estimating that the 
cost of the procedure is $12,500–16,000); Steinbock, supra note 9, at 177 (recognizing no data 
yet as to the specific cost of PGD, but each cycle of IVF can cost between $5,000–7,000, which is 
often not covered by insurance). 
 58. Botkin, supra note 27, at 25; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 18, at 80 (“Designer 
babies will be expensive at first and an option only for the well-to-do.  Whether having a designer 
baby will ever become cheap and relatively popular will depend on how rapidly technologies like 
preimplantation diagnosis come down the cost curve.”); Maxwell J. Mehlman & Kirsten M. 
Rabe, Any DNA to Declare?  Regulating Offshore Access to Genetic Enhancement, 28 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 179, 181–82 (2002) (making a similar observation with active genetic enhancement by 
noting that couples who can afford such technology are wealthier individuals who “already 
possess social advantages such as money, status and access to information concerning new 
biotechnologies” and that such technology “may inadvertently widen the gap between the rich 
and the poor”). 
 59. Botkin, supra note 27, at 25 (noting that this discrepancy represents financial and 
cultural differences). 
 60. Knox, supra note 46, at 443. 
 61. Id.; see also Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our 
Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 207 (2003). 
When the price of PGD drops low enough to make the technology standard care—and the 
pace of advancement of bioinformatics suggests it will and perhaps more quickly than 
many estimate—will the pressure to have a baby as healthy and desirable as medically 
possible actually compel prospective parents to use PGD even beyond their levels of 
comfort—meaning, ironically, could PGD become an imposition and reduce the freedom 
of parents to choose? 
Id. 
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C. Questions Surrounding the Therapeutic Uses of PGD 
Although controversial, using PGD to avoid serious and early-onset illness 
in future children is widely accepted.62  As noted in the introduction, however, 
couples have begun to use PGD for therapeutic purposes that are even more 
controversial.  These uses will be further discussed in the following sections. 
1. PGD Used for Late-Onset Disorders 
A more controversial use of PGD is testing for mere susceptibility to 
disease and for late-onset disorders, such as Huntington’s disease.63  Recently, 
a woman who carried the gene for early onset Alzheimer’s used PGD to ensure 
that her daughter would not similarly suffer from the disease.64  The American 
doctors released news of their work when they were sure that the child did not 
inherit the tendency to develop early onset Alzheimer’s.65 
Patients’ groups and ethicists protest such use of PGD because it rejects 
embryos simply because the babies would have a chance at developing a 
disease in middle age.66  They argue that the children are not born with an 
illness—just a predisposition—and to claim that their lives are not worth living 
is morally questionable.67  Advocates for PGD argue that the costs of rearing a 
child with a late-onset disease can be emotionally and financially significant 
and may be the basis of the couple’s decision whether to reproduce at all.68 
 
 62. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 327. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Nigel Hawkes, Screening Frees Baby from Mother’s Alzheimer Gene, THE TIMES OF 
LONDON, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1, available at  2002 WL 4185158.  But see Steinbock, supra note 9, 
at 187 (noting that, at this time, there is no prenatal test for Alzheimer’s).  The APOE genotype 
has been discovered to be the single most important genetic determinant of susceptibility to 
Alzheimer’s, but some individuals who have the genotype do not develop the disease and others 
with a different genotype do develop it.  Id.  Alzheimer’s is also a multifactorial disease, meaning 
it is affected by both environmental and genetic factors.  Id.  A reliable test may never be likely, 
but PGD may help reduce the risk.  For more discussion as to whether PGD should be used to 
avoid inheritance of early Alzheimer’s, see Should Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Be Used 
to Avoid Inheritance of Early Alzheimer’s Disease, FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS, Sept. 15, 2002, at 
9.  For further discussion about this first experience of using PGD for early-onset Alzheimer’s, 
see Yury Verlinsky et al., Preimplantation Diagnosis for Early-Onset Alzheimer Disease Caused 
by V717L Mutation, 287 JAMA 1018 (2002); Dena Towner & Roberta Springer Loewy, Ethics of 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for a Woman Destined to Develop Early-Onset Alzheimer 
Disease, 287 JAMA 1038 (2002). 
 65. James Chapman, The Test-Tube Girl Who Will Never Get Alzheimer’s, DAILY MAIL 
(London), Feb. 27, 2002, at 6, available at  2002 WL 14481702. 
 66. Id.; see also M. Spriggs, Genetically Selected Baby Free of Inherited Predisposition to 
Early-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 290, 290 (2002) (stating that this use of 
PGD is more controversial because “an embryo is being rejected on the basis that it may develop 
a disease in middle age”). 
 67. Chapman, supra note 65. 
 68. Roberts, supra note 23, at 12. 
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2. PGD Used to Create a “Saviour Sibling” 
A more controversial but increasingly common use of PGD is to create a 
donor child whose tissue matches with a preexisting sibling in need of a stem 
cell transplant.69  This is how the Nash family used PGD, as described in the 
first scenario.  Creating a donor child to save a sick sibling actually involves 
three technologies: IVF, PGD for tissue matching, and stem cell transplant.70  
Although there have been many documented success stories, data that 
demonstrates the efficacy of combining the technologies for saving or 
prolonging the child’s life is lacking.71  Similarly, no data examines the 
medical and psychosocial risks for both the donor and recipient child.72 
Some commentators have criticized families like the Nashes for choosing 
to use PGD to create a child for donor purposes and call this an unethical 
reason to have children and an immoral objectification of the donor child.73  
The main ethical argument against such a use is the alleged instrumentalization 
of the donor child: the donor child becomes an instrument to cure another 
child.74  It can be difficult to determine when an act instrumentalizes a 
person.75  The donor child, however, may not be instrumentalized at all 
 
 69. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 327.  The United States has no existing guidelines on the 
proper use of PGD to create a stem cell donor; the only countries believed to have done so are 
England and Australia.  Id. at 329.  This Comment summarizes the scope of the issue and offers 
recommendations as to when using PGD to create a donor child is ethical; see also R. Ashcroft, 
Bach to the Future: Response to: Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical and 
Non-medical Uses, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 217, 217 (2003) (noting that “the question is whether 
something which is not positively in a child’s interest can be tolerated or permitted if it is not 
positively against  the child’s interests”); see e.g., M. Spriggs & J. Savulescu, “Saviour 
Siblings”, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 289, 289 (2002) (showing how the news media and literature has 
referred to this trend as the creation of “saviour siblings”). 
 70. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 327. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Stephanie J. Hong, Note, And “Cloning” Makes Three: A Constitutional 
Comparison Between Cloning and Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 26 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 741, 780 (1999) (noting the presence of “commodification-objectification concerns 
in creating a child simply to produce an organ or tissue donor”). 
 74. G. Pennings et al., Ethical Considerations on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for 
HLA Typing to Match a Future Child as a Donor of Haematopoietic Stem Cells to a Sibling, 17 
HUM. REPROD. 534, 536 (2002) (noting that it is “generally agreed that using someone as a means 
is not unethical” and “[a]n action should only be condemned when it treats a person solely as a 
means”), available at http://humrep.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/full/17/3/534. 
 75. Id. (giving parents who decide to have another child as a companion and a playmate for 
the first one as an example and asking whether this second child should be considered an 
instrument).  But see Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 330 (stating that “[c]ommentators thus far have 
found the practice ethically acceptable as long as the parents intend to rear and love the donor 
child”). 
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because it is arguably unlikely that parents who take such steps to save the 
recipient child will not treat the donor child as an equal to the existing child.76 
Similarly, advocates for PGD counter that it may be more unethical not to 
use PGD if it could potentially save the life of an ill child.  Dr. Charles Strom, 
director of medical genetics at the Illinois Masonic Medical Center (where the 
Nash family used PGD), dismisses the argument that there are “good” or “bad” 
reasons to have a child.77  He stated, “People have kids for all kinds of reasons: 
to save a failing marriage, to work on the family farm, to perpetuate the family 
name.  In the scheme of things, [Adam] is the most wanted child I’ve ever met.  
They love the heck out of this kid.”78 
Opponents of PGD argue that a heavy burden is placed on the donor child: 
if the transplant fails, the child may experience feelings of unworthiness, 
deficiency, and inability to achieve expectations.79  They also believe that the 
donor child may feel hurt when he learns why he was born.80  Advocates 
counter that the donor child is too young to understand what is happening at 
the time, and when he is eventually able to understand his role in the events, 
the psychosocial effects will be more diluted and he may agree with the 
decision his parents have made.81  Learning that one was conceived to save a 
sibling might also increase self-esteem and self-worth.82  Finally, when the 
treatment is possible with umbilical cord stem cells, no real risk, harm, or pain 
is imposed on the donor child.83 
 
 76. See Mark P. Aulisio et al., Procreation for Donation: The Moral and Political 
Permissibility of “Having a Child to Save a Child,” 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 
408, 415 (2001) (noting that “it seems reasonable to assume that parents who care enough about 
an existing child to bring another child into existence partly in the hopes of saving the existing 
child are likely to love and care for their new child as well”); see also J.A. Robertson, Extending 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical and Non-Medical Uses, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 213, 
214 (2003) (suggesting that parents will value the new child for its own sake, not only for the 
stem cells it produced). 
 77. Weiss, supra note 5, at A14; see also Aulisio et al., supra note 76, at 414 (noting that 
“[a]lthough having a child to provide matching organs or tissue may be less than optimal, having 
children for certain other reasons, or no reason at all, is also less than optimal”). 
 78. Weiss, supra note 5, at A14; see also Aulisio et al., supra note 76, at 414 (suggesting 
that having a child to save a child is a better reason to have a child than any other reason and that 
procreation is not limited to those other reasons). 
 79. Pennings et al., supra note 74, at 537. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 537–38. 
 82. Id. at 537. 
 83. Id. (noting that the donation of a kidney would be a more difficult decision.  The 
subsequent use of stem cells is not against the interest of the donor child.). 
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D.  Questions Surrounding Non-therapeutic Uses of PGD 
In general, there is public support for prenatal diagnosis for “serious” 
genetic conditions.84  There is also a general belief that prenatal diagnosis for 
more minor conditions is ethically troubling, but such use is often permitted 
based on a respect for parental autonomy in reproductive matters.85  The most 
controversial uses of PGD are for those purposes that are not medical at all.86  
Such non-therapeutic uses of PGD include screening for cosmetic traits, 
performance traits, and gender/sex traits.87  This is troubling to some ethicists 
who wonder how to distinguish among reasons for wanting to create a certain 
child.88  There is a conflict in social values between “reluctance to validate 
termination of a fetus for a less than serious medical condition and a desire to 
respect parental autonomy.”89 
1. PGD Used for Cosmetic Traits 
The value conflict will continue to escalate as the number of conditions 
that can be detected by PGD rises.90  Because PGD does not involve abortion, 
parents may feel social pressure to avoid genetic disorders in their offspring 
and undergo testing.91  Parents who can afford PGD may use it to become 
increasingly selective about traits for less life-threatening reasons, which could 
 
 84. See Steinbock, supra note 9, at 179 (noting that such “serious” conditions include Tay-
Sachs disease, spina bifida, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell disease, hemophilia, and muscular 
dystrophy); see also Genetics and Public Policy Center, Berman Bioethics Institute, John Hopkins 
University, Attitudes About Reproductive Genetics (2002), at http://www.dnapolicy.org/research/ 
reproductiveGenetics.jhtml [hereinafter Attitudes About Reproductive Genetics].  The survey 
results of a random sampling of 1,211 Americans were published in December 2002.  Id.  Two-
thirds of the respondents approved of using reproductive technologies to help parents have a baby 
free of a serious genetic disease.  Id.  The greatest benefits of such technologies are the ability “to 
wipe out certain genetic diseases forever” (41 percent) and to improve the chances that the baby 
will be healthy (27 percent).  Id. 
 85. Botkin, supra note 27, at 21. 
 86. Ashcroft, supra note 69, at 217; see also Attitudes About Reproductive Genetics, supra 
note 84 (noting that over seventy percent of the respondents disapproved of using the 
technologies to identify or select traits such as strength or intelligence). 
 87. Knox, supra note 46, at 447. 
 88. Peter Gorner, Embryo Is Picked to Try to Save Sister’s Life, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 2000, at 
1. 
 89. Botkin, supra note 27, at 21. 
 90. Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 76, at 214 (stating that many predict that PGD will 
eventually be used to select traits such as intelligence, height, sexual orientation, beauty, hair and 
eye color, and memory). 
 91. King, supra note 41, at 179–80 (noting that women who refuse prenatal testing because 
they cannot kill their child-to-be receive public sympathy, but it is less likely that there will be 
that sympathy for parents who reject the opportunity of PGD merely on the grounds of wanting to 
leave things to chance); see also Botkin, supra note 27, at 23.  “Widespread use [of PGD] could 
significantly reduce societal tolerance for ‘less than perfect’ babies.”  Id. 
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lead children to higher levels of perfection.92  When multiple embryos are 
screened, there is an inherent pressure to select the most desirable traits; 
therefore, PGD has great eugenic potential.93  Opponents of PGD believe that 
the availability of several embryos means that the threshold for selection is 
lowered, and thus the slide down the slippery slope has begun.94  As Art 
Caplan, a leading ethicist, comments, “[W]hen you design children for 
purposes that are acceptable, where do you draw the line?  Blue eyes?  A 
kidney?  A testacle? [sic]  Pre-implantation genetics opens the door to those 
kinds of questions.”95  The phrase “designer children” is often used to describe 
children whose parents have used genetic technology in their creation.96  
Opponents assume, and morally condemn, the possibility that parents will 
“design their children because they are more concerned with fashion and 
pleasing themselves than with valuing the children for the children’s own 
sake.”97 
Although it is not currently possible to screen for most behavioral and 
physical traits,98 selection of traits for cosmetic purposes has been compared to 
racial discrimination.99  Parents who want to use PGD for this purpose should 
be counseled that the procedure can fail, that a child may later opt to change 
 
 92. See generally Gorner, supra note 88; see also Botkin, supra note 27, at 22.  (“[S]ome 
couples may pursue PGD for no other reason than to select their ideal embryo.  This could well 
be a growth industry in the coming century for couples who can afford it.”). 
 93. See King, supra note 41, at 180 (stating that PGD allow parents to “adopt a far more pro-
active, directing role, choosing their children in a way which is not so far removed from their 
experience as consumers, choosing amongst different products.”  King refers to this as “consumer 
eugenics.”); see also DIANE B. PAUL, CONTROLLING HUMAN HEREDITY: 1865 TO THE PRESENT 
133 (1995) (observing that “some have argued that eugenics is being revived by our increased 
ability to choose the kind of children we want”). 
 94. Pennings et al., supra note 74, at 536.  Opponents believe that the slippery slope is more 
prevalent for PGD than for other forms of prenatal diagnosis because there is no restrictive barrier 
like an abortion.  Id.  The moral and psychological influences of a possible abortion following 
other types of prenatal diagnosis function as a barrier to prevent diagnosis for “trivial” reasons.  
Id. 
 95. Gorner, supra note 88, at 1. 
 96. Donrich W. Jordaan, Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Selection: An Ethical 
Analysis, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 586, 589 (2003). 
 97. Id. (stating that the argument is that such technology is unethical because it leads to the 
instrumentalization of children). 
 98. Roberts, supra note 23, at 31; see also Robertson, supra note 76, at 214 (suggesting that 
it is still useful to consider “whether the proposed use serves valid reproductive or rearing 
interests; whether those interests are sufficient to justify creating and destroying embryos; 
whether selecting for a trait will harm resulting children; whether it will stigmatise [sic] existing 
persons, and whether it will create other social harms”). 
 99. Knox, supra note 46, at 447.  “If it is both morally and legally objectionable to 
discriminate against someone due to skin color, it may be just as unacceptable to discriminate 
against someone based on superficial traits like hair and eye color.”  Id. at 448. 
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his appearance, and that unrealistic behavior expectations should not be placed 
on children selected for desired physical traits.100 
2. PGD Used for Performance Traits 
Parents may also desire to use PGD to produce children with certain 
performance traits, such as musical talent or pitch and intelligence.  The 
selection of embryos with certain genes believed to represent favorable or 
superior genetic traits has not yet been widely practiced in the United States, 
but is likely to be used as the knowledge base of genetics expands.101  The 
strongest case for the parents to use the technology this way is if they can 
persuasively assert that they would not reproduce at all unless they could select 
that trait, and if they have a plausible explanation for that view.102  Parents can 
try to instill that trait after birth; therefore, they arguably might have that right 
before birth as well.103  To prevent the possibility that the future children will 
be exploited, these parents should again be counseled that children have a 
variety of influences exerted upon them and that they could develop other 
passions and talents.  Commentators speculate how using PGD to screen for 
non-medical conditions could potentially affect the parent–child 
relationship.104  Traditionally, parents have had hopes and expectations for 
their children, but have had little control—what would happen if parents had 
very specific expectations based on their experiences in prenatal testing and 
selection?105  There is speculation that children could feel that the essence of 
themselves no longer belongs to them because their parents oversaw it.106  
Parents may also put too much pressure on these selected children, which 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Bruce L. Wilder, Assisted Reproduction Technology: Trends and Suggestions for the 
Developing Law, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 177, 204 (2002).  This is especially 
likely if no regulatory body is established. 
 102. Robertson, supra note 76, at 215 (suggesting that preferring the trait of perfect pitch 
might be extremely important and understandable in highly musical families). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Botkin, supra note 27, at 23; King, supra note 41, at 180 (suggesting that selection of the 
“best” embryo creates a new relationship between parents and offspring). 
 105. Botkin, supra note 27, at 23. 
 106. King, supra note 41, at 180.  The author notes what Kahn has stated in reference to 
cloning: 
Part of the individuality and dignity of a person probably lies in the uniqueness and 
unpredictability surrounding his or her development.  As a result, the uncertainty of the 
great lottery of heredity constitutes the principal protection for human beings against 
biological predetermination imposed by third parties, including parents.  One of the 
blessings of the relationship between parents and their children is their inevitable 
difference, which results in parents loving their children for what they are, rather than 
endeavouring to make them what they want. 
Id. 
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could cause them to suffer psychological or self-esteem issues.107  Many of the 
traits that parents might potentially choose would make children more 
competitive in society, but success in competition and actual contentment may 
be dramatically different.108 
Using PGD to screen for non-medical traits could cause further division 
between the wealthy and the poor as noted in the previous section.109  The poor 
will face further disadvantages because they cannot afford the procedure.110  
Selection of embryos based on intelligence, physical, or psychological traits 
would contribute to inequality in society by circumventing the natural random 
process of evolution.111  Bioethicist George Annas stated: 
[t]o try to give your child a genetic head start would, I think, be irresistible for 
parents who could afford to pay for it. . . . This could be very problematic for 
society.  It’s a road I don’t think we should go down.  But it’s one I could see 
us going down very quickly as a result of advertising, peer pressure, and so 
on . . . and that parents who don’t “take advantage” of the new genetics will 
soon be seen as bad or even neglectful parents.112 
3. PGD Used for Sex Selection 
Finally, selection of children based on gender/sex traits is the most 
controversial use of PGD, as the plight of the potential parents generates little 
public sympathy.113  Because sex selection is now feasible, interest in it is 
“exploding.”114  Other countries such as India and China have long valued 
producing a baby boy and have practiced infanticide, where infants are 
suffocated shortly after birth, or have used selective abortions to terminate 
 
 107. Knox, supra note 46, at 449. 
 108. Botkin, supra note 27, at 24 (stating that “[t]here is less moral force to the claim that 
parents should be supported in their efforts to gain competitive advantage for their children, 
particularly when competitive advantage remains possible through traditional means such as 
education, wealth, and hard work”). 
 109. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 110. See Knox, supra note 46, at 449.  But see Botkin, supra note 27, at 25 (noting that 
affluent couples would be most apt to use PGD if it became commercially available; however, 
less affluent infertile couples who have their IVF costs covered by insurance may be able to use 
PGD if they could pay the additional marginal costs of genetic analysis). 
 111. Roberts, supra note 23, at 35. 
 112. Id.; see also King, supra note 41, at 181.  “Clearly, there is likely to be a tendency for 
parents to select offspring which conform best to social norms, with regard to health and physical 
ability, appearance and aptitudes.”  Id. 
 113. Ashcroft, supra note 69, at 217; see also Wilder, supra note 101, at 204 (suggesting that 
the practice is controversial because it involves the destruction of an otherwise (presumably) 
normal embryo). 
 114. Claudia Kalb, Brave New Babies, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 46 (noting the 
emergence of such web sites as http://www.choosethesexofyourbaby.com and 
http://www.myboyorgirl.com).  The web site for the Fertility Institutes in Los Angeles, which 
performs sex selection with PGD, has received 85,000 hits in the last six months.  Id. 
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female fetuses.115  Potential parents in the United States have already begun to 
use PGD to select embryos on the basis of sex.116  For example, a California 
woman with three sons used PGD in 2002 to select a girl because she wanted 
to recreate the positive relationship she had with her own mother.117  Such 
stories are becoming more common, and increasing numbers of individuals, 
geneticists, and physicians believe that people are entitled to sex selection if 
they request it.118 
Sex selection has sparked debate over whether parents’ procreative 
freedom to choose their child’s gender outweighs society’s greater concern 
regarding gender stereotypes and equality.119  Parents who desire sex selection 
state that they want a balanced family, meaning that their family has children 
of one sex and they want their last child to be of the opposite sex.120  But, to 
date, there is no evidence demonstrating that the need or desire for gender 
variety is important or whether many couples would refrain from having 
another child if PGD for sex selection was not possible.121 
One argument against this use of PGD is that sex selection will lead to a 
changed sex ratio, with fewer women than men, thus leading to inequality for 
women.122  Some fertility specialists have even referred to sex selection as sex 
 
 115. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 14–15.  Families value baby boys for continued lineage 
and economic survival of the family.  Id. at 14; see also Kalb, supra note 114, at 46 (noting that 
“[t]hroughout history, humans have wished for a child of one sex or the other and have been 
willing to do just about anything to get it”). 
 116. See Gina Kolata, Fertility Ethics Authority Approves Sex Selection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 2001, at A16 (noting that fertility specialist Dr. Norbert Gleicher stated that “we have a list of 
patients who asked for it.”).  Parents in Australia are also using PGD for sex selection.  See infra 
Part III.C. 
 117. Aaron Zitner, A Girl or a Boy, You Pick, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at A1, A13.  This is 
often described as “family balancing.”  See also David McCarthy, Why Sex Selection Should Be 
Legal, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 302, 303 (2001) (noting that couples will go to great efforts to select 
the sex of their child because they want to have a balanced family).  Other American families 
have used PGD for sex selection.  See generally Kalb, supra note 114, at 44 (describing American 
families who have used PGD, or another technology, for sex selection). 
 118. Kelly M. Plummer, Comment, Ending Parents’ Unlimited Power to Choose: Legislation 
is Necessary to Prohibit Parents’ Selection of Their Children’s Sex and Characteristics, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 517, 523 (2003).  But see Kalb, supra note 114, at 49–50 (noting that leading PGD 
authority Mark Hughes stated, “[G]ender [is not] a disease.  There is no illness, no suffering and 
no reason for a physician to be involved.  Besides, we’re too busy helping desperate couples with 
serious disease build healthy families.”). 
 119. See infra Part IV for a discussion on the scope of procreative liberty. 
 120. McCarthy, supra note 117, at 303.  But see Kalb, supra note 114, at 50 (quoting Dr. 
Mark Sauer of Columbia who “balks” at the idea of family balance.  He stated, “What are you 
balancing? It discredits the value of an individual life.”  He refuses to perform PGD solely for sex 
selection.). 
 121. Robertson, supra note 76, at 215. 
 122. McCarthy, supra note 117, at 305; see also Robertson, supra note 76, at 214.  “The use 
of medical technology to select the sex of offspring is highly controversial because of the bias 
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discrimination.123  It is speculated that selection for a first child would favor 
males, which if executed on a large scale could lead to great disparities in the 
sex ratio of the population.124  This may only slightly contribute to societal sex 
ratio imbalances, but its use is apt to reflect cultural notions of male privilege 
and could reinforce sexism toward women.125 
Those who support using PGD for sex selection argue that allowing 
families to select embryos of the desired sex will maintain population control, 
gender balancing within the family, a desire for parental companionship by 
raising a child of the same gender, and a preferred gender order among one’s 
children.126  In addition to the supposed threat to the sex ratio, opponents to 
this use of PGD also worry that it will only be available to those who can 
afford it.127  Leading ethicist Leon Kass, chair of the President’s Council on 
Bioethics, believes that “[c]hildren are going to hold their parents responsible 
for having made them this way.”128 
The ASRM has not offered consistent guidance on the issue of sex 
selection.  In 1999, the Ethics Committee of the ASRM (“the Committee”) 
reviewed sex selection for solely nonmedical reasons.129  The ASRM first 
 
against females which it usually reflects or expresses, and the resulting social disruptions which it 
might cause.”  Id. 
 123. Kolata, supra note 116, at A16 (quoting Dr James Grifo, president-elect of the Society 
for Assisted Reproductive Technology, who stated, “Sex selection is sex discrimination, and I 
don’t think that is ethical. . . . It’s not ethical to take someone off the street and help them have a 
boy or a girl.”  Dr. William Schoolcraft of the Colorado Center for Reproductive Medicine asked, 
“What’s the next step? . . . As we learn more about genetics, do we reject kids who do not have 
superior intelligence or who don’t have the right color hair and eyes? . . . We have a responsibility 
to be conservative and cautious. . . . It’s our responsibility not to misuse these technologies.”).  
See Zitner, supra note 117, at A12 (stating that Dr. Robert E. Anderson of the Southern California 
Center for Reproductive Medicine in Newport Beach finds rejecting a boy or girl when there is no 
medical need is “[m]orally reprehensible” and that “[m]ost Americans, no matter where they 
come down on the question of where life begins, would find something morally objectionable 
about creating embryos and then discarding some simply because of their sex.”); see also Kalb, 
supra note 114, at 47 (speculating whether choosing one gender over another could become this 
century’s form of sex discrimination). 
 124. Robertson, supra note 76, at 214.  But see McCarthy, supra note 117, at 305 (suggesting 
that if there were fewer women, they might be more valued and concluding overall that “the 
threat to the sex ratio is far from clear”). 
 125. Robertson, supra note 76, at 214 (also noting that using PGD for family balancing is less 
likely to be susceptible to charges of sexism). 
 126. See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Sex Selection and 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 595, 596 (1999), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/Sex_Selection.pdf [hereinafter Ethics Comm., Sex Selection 
and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis]. 
 127. McCarthy, supra note 117, at 305; see supra Part II.B.3. 
 128. Kalb, supra note 114, at 51. 
 129. See generally Ethics Comm., Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 
supra note 126, at 598. 
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noted that it is ethically acceptable to use PGD for sex selection to prevent the 
transmission of serious genetic diseases.130  The ASRM then recommended 
that, for patients undergoing IVF, PGD used for sex selection for nonmedical 
reasons should not be encouraged.131  The Committee finally concluded that 
the initiation of IVF with PGD solely for sex selection “holds even greater risk 
of unwarranted gender bias, social harm, and the diversion of medical 
resources from genuine medical need.  It therefore should be discouraged.”132 
In 2001, however, the acting head of the Committee, John Robertson, 
issued a letter in response to a doctor’s request for clarification of the ASRM’s 
position, believing that this letter reflected the position of the entire 
Committee.133  In this letter, Robertson stated that it is sometimes acceptable 
for couples to choose the sex of their children by picking an embryo of the 
desired gender and discarding the rest.134  He stated that “gender variety” was 
one acceptable use of this sex selection technique.135  Robertson believed that 
gender variety could be offered “when there is a good reason to think that the 
couple is fully informed of the risks of the procedure and are counseled about 
having unrealistic expectations about the behavior of children of the preferred 
gender.”136  Physicians thus could offer PGD for sex selection under certain 
conditions.137 
 
 130. Id. (recognizing that such use “is not inherently gender biased, bears little risk of 
consequences detrimental to individuals or to society, and represents a use of medical resources 
for reasons of human health”). 
 131. Id. (noting that there is “some risk of gender bias, harm to individuals and society, and 
inappropriateness in the use and allocation of limited medical resources”). 
 132. Id. (emphasis added). 
 133. Kolata, supra note 116, at A16. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (meaning that a couple who had a child of one sex could ethically choose embryos to 
guarantee the embryo selected was of the opposite sex). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  The doctor’s request, and Robertson’s response, sprang out of the Committee’s 2001 
finding that preconception gender selection methods like sperm sorting could be used for gender 
variety.  Id.  In this 2001 report, the Committee stated that couples seeking gender variety in their 
offspring can be offered preconception gender selection if they: 
[1] are fully informed of the risks of failure, [2] affirm that they will fully accept children 
of the opposite sex if the preconception gender selection fails, [3] are counseled about 
having unrealistic expectations about the behavior of children of the preferred gender, and 
[4] are offered the opportunity to participate in research to track and assess the safety, 
efficacy, and demographics of preconception selection. 
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Preconception Gender Selection for 
Nonmedical Reasons, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 861, 863–64 (2001), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/preconceptiongender.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).  The 
Committee also noted that “[p]ractitioners offering assisted reproductive services are under no 
legal or ethical obligation to provide nonmedically indicated preconception methods of gender 
selection.”  Id. at 864. 
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In the spring of 2002, the Committee revised Robertson’s controversial 
opinion, and the practice of using PGD for the first child or for gender variety 
was once again discouraged.138  The new Committee report (again penned by 
Robertson) concluded that sperm sorting and PGD were different, because the 
former does not involve the creation and destruction of embryos.139  As 
Robertson explained, the Committee felt that because embryos have the 
potential to implant and bring forth a new person, they deserve “special 
respect” and “the interest in choosing the gender of offspring had not yet been 
shown to be strong enough to justify the creation and destruction of embryos 
solely for gender variety in a family.”140 
III.  INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF PGD 
To date, the United States has created virtually no federal regulation 
regarding PGD, but other countries have taken a more definitive stance and 
have exerted some control over PGD, or, alternatively, have outlawed it all 
together.  PGD is banned in Austria, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland.141  Its 
use is limited by legislation in France, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom.142  Belgium, Israel, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and the United 
Kingdom control PGD by a national oversight agency.143  This section will 
more closely examine how some of these countries have responded to the 
development of PGD and other ARTs. 
 
 138. John Robertson, Sex Selection: Final Word from the ASRM Ethics Committee on the Use 
of PGD, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 6, 6; see also Gina Kolata, Fertility Society 
Opposes Choosing Embryos Just for Sex Selection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at A16.  A chain 
of fertility centers said it would immediately abide by the decision.  Id. 
 139. Robertson, supra note 138, at 6. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Melissa Healy, Fertility’s New Frontier, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at F8.  See generally 
John Harris, Stem Cells, Sex, and Procreation, 12 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 353, 
356–60 (2003) (discussing which European countries conduct embryo research).  Germany and 
Austria ban all embryo research.  Id. at 358. 
 142. See Healy, supra note 141, at F8.  See generally Harris, supra note 141, at 358 
(discussing which European countries conduct embryo research).  France “allows ‘the study of 
embryos without prejudicing their integrity’ and preimplantation diagnosis.”  Id.  Spain offers 
protection to the in vitro viable embryo, and it permits embryo research under specified 
conditions.  Id.  Finland and Spain also permit embryo research under specified conditions, while 
the United Kingdom has the most liberal research conditions.  Id. 
 143. See Healy, supra note 141, at F1.  See generally Harris, supra note 141, at 358 (noting 
that for embryo research, Italy and Greece rely on the stipulated conditions of the Council of 
Europe’s Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine). 
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A. England 
The use of PGD is authorized on a case-by-case basis, as outlined in the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990.144  The Act also created the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (“HFEA”), which licenses and 
regulates the use of PGD and generally regulates clinics offering assisted 
reproductive procedures.145  The HFEA defines the limits of where research 
and treatment may venture and assures public representation by requiring that 
half of its members be specialists in areas outside of medicine and research.146  
The HFEA has established training and assessment criteria for laboratories and 
individuals carrying out the embryo biopsy part of the PGD procedure, and 
clinics cannot perform any other tests or treat individuals for new disorders 
without approval.147  By March 15, 2004, PGD was available at ten fertility 
clinics in England.148 
The English media has extensively debated and discussed the different 
uses of PGD.  Unlike the United States, PGD can be used to determine gender 
in England only when there is a need to avoid a serious genetic condition.149  
This ban was challenged in 2000 by a Scottish family who wanted to use PGD 
to conceive a girl after the death of their only daughter, but no fertility clincs 
 
 144. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.); see also John 
McMillan, Sex Selection in the United Kingdom, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 28, 29.  
McMillan describes the Act as follows: 
The act divides treatments involving human gametes and embryos into three categories.  
First, there are treatments that are illegal.  Second, there are treatments that are illegal 
unless carried out by a licensed clinic. . . . [These] include the creation of embryos in 
vitro, keeping embryos or gametes, placing any embryo into a woman, and, crucially, 
practices as may be specified in or determined in regulations.  Finally, there are those 
treatments that are not covered by the act and can lawfully be carried out without a 
license.  Examples of such treatment include artificial insemination using the husband’s 
sperm, and gamete intra fallopian transfer. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 145. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.), supra note 144, at § 8 
(describing the general functions of the HFEA); McMillan, supra note 144, at 29 (noting that the 
HFEA publishes a code of practice for licensed clinics and also inspects these clinics to see that 
the standards are met); Roberts, supra note 23, 46. 
 146. Roberts, supra note 23, at 46. 
 147. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, supra note 144, at §§ 9–10 (describing the 
HFEA’s licensing committees and licensing procedure); see also Roberts, supra note 23, at 29. 
 148. Dr. Jess Buxton, Embryo Screening (PGD), at http://www.bionews.org.uk/update.lasso? 
storyid=1639 (last updated March 15, 2004). 
 149. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Revised Code of Practice, Sixth Ed., § 
8.9 (2003) (stating that “[t]reatment centres are expected not to . . . [s]elect the sex of embryos for 
social reasons”).  See McMillan, supra note 144, at 29.  Creating embryos for IVF is legal only 
when it is performed by a licensed clinic in accordance with HFEA guidelines, so sex selection 
that relies on PGD is ruled out.  Id. 
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were willing to defy the HFEA policy.150  The HFEA renewed its ban of sex 
selection for nonmedical reasons on November 12, 2003. 
England also strictly regulates the use of PGD to create “saviour siblings.”  
The HFEA first announced in December 2001 that couples could use IVF and 
PGD to select an embryo that is a matched donor for an existing sick sibling.151  
The chair of the HFEA stated that such use could be justified, but that this was 
likely to happen “in very rare circumstances and under strict controls.”152  The 
HFEA outlined several conditions that must be met before the procedure could 
be used: 
[1] All other possibilities of treatment and sources of tissue for the 
affected child should have been explored. 
[2] The condition of the child should be severe or life-threatening. 
[3] The technique should not be available where the intended tissue 
recipient is a parent. 
[4] Couples undergoing this treatment should receive counseling. 
[5] Embryos should not be genetically modified to provide a tissue 
match.153 
The HFEA’s announcement sparked immediate controversy, raising many 
concerns similar to those discussed in Part II.154 The Comment on 
Reproductive Ethics (“CORE”) immediately challenged whether the HFEA 
had the authority to grant IVF clinics licenses to carry out the procedure;155 
 
 150. Buxton, supra note 148; Disappointment for Embryo Sex Selection Couple, at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/ new.lasso?storyid=823 (last updated Mar. 12, 2001).  The HFEA is 
reviewing one loophole in its guidelines.  McMillan, supra note 144, at 29.  Under the Code of 
Practice, it is possible that a clinic that is not licensed could offer preconception gender selection 
techniques like sperm sorting.  Id.  The HFEA will likely move to make nonmedical sex selection 
illegal.  Id. 
 151. HFEA Allows PGD and Tissue Typing, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/update.lasso? 
storyid =1114 (last updated Dec. 17, 2001). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Roger Highfield, Fertility Authority Gives Go-Ahead for ‘Designer Babies’, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 13, 2001, at 9. 
 154. Id.  Lord Winston, a fertility expert who helped develop PGD, stated that he feared that 
this use of PGD treated the new offspring as a “commodity.”  Id.  He also questioned how parents 
would regard the child if the technique failed and whether it was fair to potentially subject the 
donor child to a lifetime of donating cells to a sibling.  Id. 
 155. See The Queen v. Human Fertilisation Auth., 2003 P. 878, 883 (Eng. C.A.), available at 
2003 WL 21047341.  Josephine Quintavalle acted on behalf of CORE, a group whose purpose is 
“to focus and facilitate debate on ethical issues arising from human reproduction and, in 
particular, assisted reproduction.”  Id.  A principal tenet of CORE is absolute respect for the 
human embryo.  Id. 
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CORE was adamant that Parliament did not give this power to the HFEA.156  A 
high court judge ruled that the HFEA did not have this legal power; but the 
HFEA appealed the ruling, and the ban was overturned by the Court of Appeal 
in April 2003.157  Opponents of PGD are mounting a challenge in the House of 
Lords.158 
Due to the global attention surrounding the Nash story, the HFEA had 
received an application for a similar use even before the 2001 announcement 
was made.159  The Hashmi family sought to use PGD to conceive a donor child 
to help their young son, who is affected by the rare blood disorder 
thalassaemia.160  Permission was granted by the HFEA in 2001.161  The 
Hashmis resumed PGD after the Court of Appeals decision in April 2003, but 
stopped treatment in July 2004 after six unsuccessful attempts.162  The couple’s 
doctors were reluctant to continue because Mrs. Hashmi is forty years old, so 
the couple is now considering using two frozen embryos from previous 
treatments or trying gene therapy for their son.163  The recent decision by the 
House of Lords means that the Hashmis could continue to try to create a 
“saviour sibling” to help their son. 
 
 156. See Josephine Quintavalle, Creating Embryos for the Benefit of Sick Siblings: Whose 
Decision?, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/commentary.lasso?storyid=1645 (last updated Apr. 22, 
2003). 
 157. Buxton, supra note 148.  For the entire opinion of the Court of Appeal, see Human 
Fertilisation Auth., 2003 P. at 914–15 (holding that PGD, including “tissue typing,” was governed 
by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act because the testing of an embryonic cell fell 
under the “concept of treatment services” within the meaning of the Act).  The HFEA could 
therefore “allow tissue typing to test an embryo for tissue compatibility with an affected sibling.”  
Id. at 915.  Tissue typing, in brief, is a PGD technique that determines if an embryo has cells 
suitable to save the ill child.  See ‘Saviour Sibling’ Ruling to be Challenged, at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=1963 (last updated Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
‘Saviour Sibling’]. 
 158. The highest court ruled that the HFEA’s decision to allow a family to create a “saviour 
sibling” was lawful.  As a result, the HFEA can continue to issue licenses for families who want 
to create an IVF baby that could provide tissue-matched cord blood to treat a sick sibling.  
Josephine Quintavalle and CORE were “devastated” by the result.  Law Lords Back “Saviour” 
Siblings, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=2542 (Apr. 28, 2005). 
 159. Highfield, supra note 153, at 9. 
 160. Hashmis Fail in ‘Saviour Sibling’ Attempt, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/ 
new.lasso?storyid=2180 (July 9, 2004); Beezy Marsh, The Sick Little Boy Science Won’t Save, 
DAILY MAIL (England), Aug. 2, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 23510298; see also MOSBY’S, 
supra note 4, at 1604 (defining thalassemia as “a hemolytic hemoglobinopathy anemia 
characterized by microcytic, hypochromic, and short-lived red blood cells caused by deficient 
hemoglobin synthesis”). 
 161. Hashmis Fail in ‘Saviour Sibling’ Attempt, supra note 160. 
 162. Id. (noting that the couple suffered one miscarriage and had three embryos in the last 
attempt that were perfect matches for their son, but they failed to develop in the womb). 
 163. Id. 
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The HFEA was heavily criticized when it refused another family’s request 
to use PGD in the same way.  The Whitaker family wanted to screen embryos 
to create a sibling to save their three-year-old son Charlie, who suffered from a 
rare form of anemia.164  The HFEA denied the plan, however, and 
distinguished this from the Hashmis’ situation because there is no apparent 
threat that Charlie’s disorder has a genetic cause and therefore the PGD would 
be used solely to ensure a tissue match for him.165  This would violate the 
HFEA rule that embryos can be screened only if it is to prevent a genetic 
disorder from being passed on.166 
The plight of the Whitaker family prompted an outpouring of debate and 
support in the press, as well as questions whether the HFEA position should be 
changed.167  The Whitakers received support from some doctors, including the 
 
 164. Marsh, supra note 160, at 5 (stating that Charlie suffers from Diamond-Blackfan anemia, 
meaning that his body does not produce a sufficient number of red blood cells and that he needs 
blood transfusions every three weeks and has a twelve-hour infusion into his stomach five nights 
per week); see also MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, & 
ALLIED HEALTH 96 (7th ed. 2003) (defining Diamond-Blackfan anemia as “idiopathic 
progressive anemia occurring in the first year of life, without leukopenia and thrombocytopenia; 
it is due to an isolated defect in erythropoiesis and is unresponsive to hematinics, requiring 
multiple blood transfusions to sustain life.  For those responding to steroid therapy, the prognosis 
is good.”). 
 165. Marsh, supra note 160, at 5; see also Sarah Boseley, As Age of the Saviour Sibling 
Dawns, Pressure Mounts Inexorably to Change Embryo Rules, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 
20, 2003, at 3, available at 2003 WLNR 4550837 (explaining that there are only 600 to 700 
children and adults with Charlie’s condition in the world and therefore there is no high risk that a 
newborn sibling would also inherit the disease). 
 166. Marsh, supra note 160, at 5. 
 167. Juliet Tizzard, Should PGD be Considered Case by Case?, at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/commentary.lasso?storyid=1344 (Aug. 12, 2002) (suggesting that the 
HFEA should reconsider PGD by not restricting access to it and by approving cases where the 
intention is to save or improve lives); see also George Wright, Call for Debate over ‘Designer 
Baby’ Laws, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (United Kingdom), June 19, 2003, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,980740,00.html (quoting Liberal Democrat 
Member of Parliament, Evan Harris, who stated: 
It is high time that the government allowed proper public and parliamentary debate and 
amendment to the Human Fertility and Embryology Act to permit this sort of treatment.  
The Act is [thirteen] years old and is no longer up to date with clinical developments.  The 
so-called positive selection of embryos with life-saving characteristics for siblings should 
be allowed since the exclusion, or so-called negative selection, of embryos with serious 
but non-fatal diseases is permitted. 
Id.  In response to the calls for a change in the law, the chair of the HFEA stated, “As the gap 
widens between the technology that was available when the act was passed in 1990, and the new 
technology available today, we may need to look at the act again.”  Id.; see also Martin 
Hutchinson, Scientists Back ‘Donor Babies’, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3031830.stm 
(last updated June 30, 2003) (quoting Hans Evers, the chair of the European Society for Human 
Reproduction and Embryology, who stated, “The solution is morally acceptable if the use as a 
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British Medical Association.168  After they were denied, the Whitakers traveled 
to the Reproductive Genetics Institute in Chicago, Illinois, to receive the 
treatment, and James Harry Whitaker was born in June 2003.169  The couple 
later learned that the baby was a tissue match, and stem cells from James’s 
umbilical cord were transferred to Charlie in July 2004.170  Although there are 
early indications that Charlie is beating his illness, he will not be declared 
cured until one year after the transplant.171 
In the aftermath of the Hashmi and Whitaker stories, and the statements of 
the chair of the HFEA, the Science and Technology Committee of the United 
Kingdom House of Commons announced in October 2003 that it would 
examine whether the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was still 
working effectively.172  The Committee had previously called for the Act to be 
updated in 2002, but the government failed to take action.173  In late July 2004, 
the HFEA announced that no distinction should be made between the cases of 
the Hashmi family and the Whitaker family—PGD would be allowed for the 
sole purpose of tissue typing.174  The HFEA emphasized that an application to 
perform the procedure must be accompanied by evidence from the clinical 
team treating the sick child and that all other alternatives must first be 
exhausted.175 
B. Germany 
In sharp contrast to England and the United States, Germany has 
traditionally outlawed PGD.176  No German law outright forbids PGD, nor is 
 
donor is not the only motive for the parents to have the child—they intend to love and care for 
this child to the same extent as they love and care for the affected child.”). 
 168. Boseley, supra note 165, at 3. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Charlie Whitaker Has Stem Cell Transplant, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/ 
new.lasso?storyid=2210 (July 28, 2004). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Human Fertilisation Act Under Scrutiny, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/ 
new.lasso?storyid=1868 (Oct. 27, 2003). 
 173. Id. 
 174. HFEA Allow PGD for HLA Tissue Typing, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/ 
new.lasso?storyid=2200 (July 22, 2004) (noting that the chair of the HFEA stated, “Our review of 
available evidence does not indicate that the embryo biopsy procedure disadvantages resulting 
babies . . . risks associated with sibling to sibling stem cell donation are low”); see also Fletchers 
Given ‘Saviour Sibling’ Go-Ahead, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=2259 (Sept. 
6, 2004) (describing how the HFEA granted permission for a couple to use PGD to conceive a 
baby who could provide umbilical cord blood cells to their son, who suffers from the rare blood 
condition Diamond-Blackfan anemia). 
 175. HFEA Allow PGD for HLA Tissue Typing, supra note 174. 
 176. German National Ethics Council, Genetic Diagnosis Before and During Pregnancy 
(stating that it is controversial whether PGD is within the Embryo Protection Law), at 
http://www.ethikrat.org/_english/main_topics/pndpgd.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004); see also 
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the term mentioned in any federal law.177  The government, however, did enact 
the Embryo Protection Law, which was intended to protect embryos from 
“improper use” and to prevent modern reproductive technologies from being 
abused.178  PGD has been uniformly opposed by all German political parties.179  
Performing any embryological research was viewed as entering the slippery 
slope that might lead to a population policy similar to that implemented by 
Nazi Germany.180 
German law appears somewhat inconsistent, as the selection of healthy 
embryos before pregnancy is prohibited, but an abortion several weeks later 
with the same medical indications is allowed.181  The focus of the German 
decision-making process is the woman and not the fetus.182 Additionally, 
Germany has enacted guidelines for the use of IVF, which is only permitted for 
treatment of an infertile couple, and has established regulations for the Federal 
Physicians Chamber, which also forbids the use of PGD.183 
The German Medical Association has concluded that if PGD was allowed, 
its potential misuse could be prevented by excluding sex selection for social 
 
Harris, supra note 141, at 359 (discussing Germany’s approach to stem cell and embryo 
research).  The author notes that abortion is permissible for a variety of reasons, that the abortion 
pill RU-486 is available, but that research on embryos is prohibited.  Id.; see also Nicole 
Richardt, A Comparative Analysis of the Embryological Research Debate in Great Britain and 
Germany, 10 SOC. POL. 86, 89 (2003) (noting that, unlike England, the German law does not 
separate the early states of life from the later ones and thus the embryo is granted in vitro 
personhood status).  Therefore, all kinds of embryological research are prohibited, PGD is not 
available, and embryo selection during infertility treatment is avoided by limiting the number of 
fertilized eggs that can be implanted into the womb.  Id. 
 177. M. Ludwig et al., The Situation of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in Germany: 
Legal and Ethical Problems, 20 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 567, 567 (2000), available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/72512975/PDFSTART (published online 
July 21, 2000).  But see FUKUYAMA, supra note 18, at 205 (noting that since passing the embryo 
law in 1990, Germany has regulated areas such as abuse of human embryos, sex selection, and 
cloning, among others). 
 178. Stefan Mueller, Ethics and the Regulation of Preimplantation Diagnosis in Germany, 7 
EUBIOS J. ASIAN & INT’L BIOETHICS 5, 5–6 (1997), available at http://www.biol.tsukuba.ac.jp/ 
~macer/EJ71/EJ71D.html. 
 179. Richardt, supra note 176, at 110. 
 180. Id.  The common good and the interests of society as a whole were the basis for the 
rejection of embryological research in Germany.  Id.  In England, however, the effects of such 
legislation were judged on the basis of the effects on an individual.  Id. 
 181. Mueller, supra note 178, at 5–6.  “Termination is permitted when a prospective mother 
believes that she cannot manage her future life if her child is affected with a genetic condition or 
when the woman has a life-threatening medical or psychiatric condition that would be adversely 
affected by the birth of a child.” Ludwig et al., supra note 177, at 567. 
 182. Ludwig et al., supra note 177, at 569. 
 183. Mueller, supra note 178, at 5–6; see also Richardt, supra note 176, at 90 (noting that 
although embryological research is prohibited, Germany does permit ARTs, which the medical 
profession regulates through internal codes and guidelines). 
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reasons as well as genetic conditions having little or no impact on children’s 
health.184  A main argument in support of legalization is that termination of a 
pregnancy after more traditional prenatal diagnosis could be avoided.185  But 
the debate continues—although a couple’s desire to have children should be 
taken seriously, some feel that does not imply an inalienable right to PGD.186 
There is some indication that the German government might begin to 
revise its opinion.  In early 2003, the National Ethics Council issued a press 
release in which the Council “unanimously recommends regulating the use 
of . . . [PGD] in a special comprehensive reproductive medicine law.”187  The 
statement elaborated: 
[T]he National Ethics Council consequently does not consider it to be its task 
to embrace a particular regulatory arrangement or indeed to recommend that 
arrangement to lawmakers as ultimately the only possible option. 
The Council’s job is, rather, to develop arguments and point out possible 
solutions connected with these arguments.  It must be left to parliament to 
choose the legislative path that, in its view and in cognizance of these 
arguments, is appropriate.188 
While all Council members agreed that some sort of comprehensive law 
should be adopted, they differ in whether the use of PGD in Germany should 
be allowed.  Nine out of twenty-five members still favor no use of PGD in 
Germany at all.189  A majority of Council members (fifteen of twenty-five) 
favor introducing legislation to allow PGD to be used to screen for “serious 
genetic disorders which cause conditions that can not [sic] be treated, serious 
chromosome disorders, and for the treatment of infertile couples if the use of 
 
 184. Ludwig et al., supra note 177, at 569 (recommending that couples at risk for having 
children with a severe genetic disease be permitted to use PGD). 
 185. Briefing of the Institut Mensch, Ethik, and Wissenschaft, Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis—A Questionable Procedure, at http://www.imew.de/index_en.php/action/article/ 
aid/83 (Jan. 2003). 
 186. See generally id. (identifying similar concerns as those raised in the United States and 
stating that restricting PGD to serious disorders is not possible, nor is review of each individual 
case by a central ethics committee, which would be a “scarcely justifiable invasion of the 
autonomy of the couples concerned”). 
 187. Press Release, National Ethics Council, National Ethics Council Presents its Opinion on 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, at http://www.ethikrat.org/_english/press/ 
Ethics_Council_PR_2003_01.pdf (Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release].  But see Richardt, 
supra note 176, at 116 (noting that a significant resistance toward PGD and embryological 
research remains). 
 188. Press Release, supra note 187; see also Richardt, supra note 176, at 117 (noting that 
“[t]he council also recommended to regulate all questions concerning reproductive medicine in a 
Reproductive Medicine Act and, thus to revise the Embryo Protection Act”) (citation omitted). 
 189. Ursula Roos, German Ethics Council Publishes Report on Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis, at http://www.britischebotschaft.de/en/embassy/r&t/notes/rt-note03.2010_german 
_ethic_council.html (Feb. 4, 2003). 
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PGD would increase the chances of successful infertility treatment.”190  These 
members, however, would also establish several limitations on use before the 
ban is removed.191  For example, couples should receive adequate counseling 
on ethical, medical, psychological, and social aspects of the procedure; licenses 
should be given to a limited number of centers; and regulations should be 
devised to ensure that PGD is used for only specific indications.192 
The sentiment of the German public is similar to that of the National Ethics 
Council.  A study by German researchers of both infertile couples and the 
general population revealed that current legislation is “out of step” with public 
attitudes towards the use of PGD, egg donation, and surrogacy.193  Although 
the results showed that Germans were not well-informed about PGD or 
assisted reproductive procedures, the majority thought that PGD should be 
allowed for the detection of genetic diseases in embryos.194  High percentages 
of both groups were against the use of PGD for sex selection or non-disease 
related reasons.195  Perhaps the feelings of the general public and the National 
Ethics Council will prompt the German government to reconsider its current 
position. 
C. Australia 
IVF has a long history in Australia.  Approximately two percent of all 
babies born there are conceived as a result of IVF, and after the world’s first 
IVF baby was born in England, twelve of the next fourteen IVF babies were 
born in Australia.196  In Australia, PGD is offered by IVF clinics.197  ARTs are 
being used almost entirely to treat infertility and prevent genetic disease.198 
PGD is as controversial a topic in the Australian media as it is elsewhere in 
the world.  Though the Sydney IVF clinic is where couples first sought 
treatment, more clinics are being granted conditional approval for the process 
by the Infertility Treatment Authority (“ITA”).199  In 2002, the ITA in the state 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. German Study Shows Support for Assisted Reproduction, at http://www.bionews.org.uk/ 
new.lasso?storyid=2162 (June 28, 2004). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Mandi Zonneveldt, Doing God’s Work, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (New South Wales, 
Australia), June 29, 2003, at 92, available at 2003 WL 64848534 (also noting that “IVF is now 
considered a norm, rather than a heinous idea from the realms of science-fiction,” but that it still 
has its detractors in the Catholic Church and right-to-life activists). 
 197. Julian Savulescu, Sex Selection: The Case For, 171 MED. J. AUSTL. 373, 373 (1999), 
available at http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/171_7_041099/savulescu/savulescu.html. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Judy Skatssoon, The Age of the Designer Baby Dawns, AUSTRL. ASSOCIATED PRESS 
GENERAL NEWS, Apr. 17, 2002, available at 2002 WL 18029234 (noting that the Sydney IVF 
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of Victoria gave permission to Roman Curkowskyj and Tania Kutny, the 
parents of a toddler suffering from Fanconi’s anemia, to use PGD to conceive a 
sibling in an attempt to save her life.200  Until then, Australia had outlawed 
such tissue typing and the notion of saviour siblings.201  The ITA now 
considers applications for HLA tissue matching and PGD on a case-by-case 
basis.202 
The different states within Australia decide how to regulate PGD and IVF.  
The ITA has stated that its understanding of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 
is that PGD should be used “only for those conditions or abnormalities which 
will significantly adversely affect the health of a person[] who may be 
born.”203  The ITA is a statutory authority with responsibility for administering 
provisions of the Act.204 
Sex selection for nonmedical reasons receives great debate in Australia and 
is becoming more common.  The Sydney IVF clinic allowed 120 couples to 
use PGD to select the sex of their child for purely social reasons in 2002 
alone.205  Somewhat surprisingly, sixty-four percent of parents wanted a girl, 
and the most common reason for undergoing the procedure was family 
 
clinic “prides itself” in its expertise in this field and that at the Melbourne IVF clinic one couple 
was granted conditional approval); see also Clinic Testing for Genetic Disorders, CANBERRA 
TIMES (Australia), Dec. 20, 2003, at 6, available at 2003 WL 70551583 (reporting that a clinic in 
Canberra has begun to offer PGD testing). 
 200. Vikki Leone, Babies by Design, THE AGE (Australia), Apr. 24, 2002, at 11, available at 
2002 WL 19619029.  For a definition of Fanconi’s anemia, see supra note 4. 
 201. Leone, supra note 200 (noting that the procedure could only be used for a sibling and 
that individual cases had to be approved by an ethics committee). 
 202. Infertility Treatment Authority, Tissue Typing in Conjunction with Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis § 2.2, at http://www.ita.org.au/_documents/policies/policy_PGD_HLA 
_matching.pdf (reviewed Jan. 2003).  These guidelines also state that the donor child can only 
provide cord blood or bone marrow.  Id.  “The harvesting of ‘hard’ or non-regenerative organs is 
not acceptable.”  Id.; see also Australian Couples to Have ‘Saviour Siblings’, at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=2017 (Mar. 15, 2004) (noting that the president of 
the Australian Medical Association said, “The AMA would not sanction the selection of an 
embryo simply to produce a child exclusively to help treat an existing sibling,” but if the parents’ 
intent was to create a child that is disease free and could help a sick sibling, “then it could be 
argued that is ethically correct.”). 
 203. Infertility Treatment Authority, Genetic Testing and the Requirements of the Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995 § 1, at http://www.ita.org.au/_documents/licencing/PGD_Policy_January 
_04.pdf (updated Jan. 2004).  This site also summarizes legal requirements, ethical 
considerations, when notification of using PGD is required, criteria for assessment of 
applications, and the mechanism for appeal in case the application is denied.  Id. at §§ 2–6. 
 204. Id. at § 2. 
 205. Zoe Taylor, Designer Babies a Growing Trend, COURIER MAIL (Queensland, Australia), 
Nov. 10, 2003, at 3 (noting that more than 250 couples have used PGD for sex selection since 
1995). 
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balancing.206  A well-known advocate for sex selection, Julian Savulescu, 
argues that “[i]t is totalitarian for the State to dictate which children parents 
should have and rear.”207  In Victoria, § 50(2) of the Infertility Treatment Act 
1995208 explicitly bans sex selection employing artificial insemination or IVF 
for non-medical reasons.209  In South Australia, artificial fertilization can only 
be used for the treatment of infertility under § 13 of the Reproductive 
Technology Act 1988.210  Each of these Acts provides exceptions to avoid the 
risk of transmitting a genetic defect.211  New South Wales is considered to 
have some of the most liberal guidelines in Australia, as the hard decisions are 
made by ethics committees at the IVF clinics—not a state regulatory body.212 
IV.  ANALYSIS: IS IT POSSIBLE TO REGULATE PGD BASED ON THE PARENTS’ 
INTENT? 
As seen in the preceding section, some nations regulate and restrict the use 
of PGD much more than the United States.  But the use of PGD for sex 
selection that has already occurred in Australia and the United States 
demonstrates that this practice—and using PGD to select solely for non-
therapeutic traits—could become increasingly common.213  The federal 
government needs to regulate this technology by enacting legislation to ensure 
that it is not used in non-therapeutic ways.  The primary argument against 
regulating PGD or any ART is that regulation would violate procreative 
liberty, but there is also strong support that procreative liberty is not a limitless 
right.214  This Section argues that legislation could be drafted in such a way 
that would limit the uses of PGD based on the parents’ motivation for 
 
 206. Id. (also noting that other reasons were a desire for a particular parent–child relationship 
and a desire to replace a child who had died or been lost in pregnancy). 
 207. Savulescu, supra note 197, at 374–75 (also noting that “‘[p]rocreative autonomy’ is the 
liberty to decide when and how to have children according to what parents judge is best.  Parents 
know best their own circumstances, and ultimately it is parents who must live with and make 
sacrifices for their children.”). 
 208. Infertility Treatment Act, 1995, § 50 (Vic.). 
 209. Savulescu, supra note 197, at 373–74. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Zonneveldt, supra note 196. 
 213. See Malinowski, supra note 61, at 223–24 (suggesting that the motion picture Gattaca 
“depicts a United States society in the not-too-distant future obsessed with genetic perfection in 
which ART and PGD are the standard of care for conceiving a child.”  The author notes that when 
the movie was released in 1997, the biotechnology industry characterized the film as science 
fiction.  Now, however, “[r]enowned bioethicists . . . respected broadcast journalists, and others 
are referring to Gattaca as a prophetic depiction of the society we could become.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 214. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2, IV.B.2. 
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undergoing the procedure and also demonstrates why it should be regulated 
from a public policy perspective. 
A. Argument that PGD Should Be Used for Any Purpose 
1. Explanation of Procreative Liberty 
In the United States, proposals for greater social oversight of any ART, 
including PGD, prompt us to question “the allocation of authority between 
individuals and society in the area of reproductive decision-making.”215  If one 
views the decision as a private matter, then it would be protected from 
society’s control, and the role of public policy would be quite limited.216  If 
one views this decision as a species-level issue, then individual preferences 
should give way to a collective determination of the overall social good.217  
This view supports restricting or prohibiting practices that are considered to be 
“inconsistent with overall social welfare.”218 
Resolving these views largely depends on the way in which the United 
States Supreme Court interprets procreative liberty.219  A finding that ARTs 
 
 215. Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Constitution, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57, 59 (2002); see Attitudes About Reproductive Genetics, supra note 84 
(noting that “[m]ost respondents think the government should regulate the quality and safety of 
reproductive genetic technologies and limit human cloning.”  The fears about ARTs are that they 
are too much like “playing God” (thirty-four percent) or that “they can be easily used for the 
wrong purposes” (thirty-five percent).). 
 216. Coleman, supra note 215, at 59–60 (suggesting public policy would be “limited to 
purposes such as facilitating informed decisions by individuals, enhancing the quality of services 
by ART practitioners, and clarifying the parental rights and responsibilities of persons involved in 
the process”) (footnotes omitted); see also John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring 
Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 422–23 (1996) (stating that “[i]f people are generally free 
to choose whether or not to reproduce, and if the genetic characteristics of expected offspring will 
affect that decision, it would appear that prospective parents should be free to use genetic 
information in making those decisions”).  Yet Robertson also recognizes that shaping offspring 
traits seems to be “an unprecedented exercise of control over the lives” that “could lead to 
viewing children as commodities[] and undermine their inherent worth and dignity.”  Id. 
 217. Coleman, supra note 215, at 59–60. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 60; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 148 (1993) (defining 
procreative autonomy as the right of individuals “to control their own role in procreation unless 
the state has a compelling reason for denying them that control”); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, 
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 16, 22–23 
(1994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE).  Robertson describes the principle of 
procreative liberty as protecting “the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring and to 
control the use of one’s reproductive capacity.”  Id. at 16.  He defines procreative liberty as “the 
freedom to reproduce or not reproduce in the genetic sense.”  Id. at 22–23.  Procreative liberty is 
so important because “control over whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, 
to dignity, and to the meaning of one’s life.”  Id. at 24.  Robertson also notes that the “liberty” in 
procreative liberty is a negative right, meaning that “a person violates no moral duty in making a 
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are a constitutionally protected interest might preclude outright prohibitions on 
their use, but if these decisions do not warrant special constitutional protection, 
then the government could regulate in virtually any manner it chooses.220  
Opponents of regulation fear that if the government implemented some sort of 
regulation, it would be incapable of limiting the scope of regulations.221 
Constitutional analysis of ART relies on a great deal of speculation, as the 
Supreme Court has never recognized outright a constitutional right to 
procreate,222 but John Robertson, a leading authority on procreative liberty, 
believes that it exists.223  Because of his prominence within the field, the views 
presented in this Section will primarily be based on his writings and theories.  
Robertson notes two types of procreative liberty: the freedom to avoid 
reproduction and the freedom to reproduce (procreate).224  The freedom to 
avoid reproduction is thought to be implied in the Court’s cases dealing with 
contraception and abortion.225  The freedom to procreate causes considerably 
more debate. 
 
procreative choice, and that other persons have a duty not to interfere with that choice.”  Id. at 23 
(footnote omitted).  Similarly, procreative liberty is a “negative right against state interference 
with choices to procreate or to avoid procreation.”  Id. 
 220. Coleman, supra note 215, at 60. 
 221. Alexander N. Hecht, Comment, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 235 (2001). 
 222. Coleman, supra note 215, at 61. 
 223. See generally ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219. 
 224. Id. at 25. 
 225. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (protecting the right of married 
couples to use contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972) (extending the 
right to use contraceptives to unmarried people); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973) 
(establishing a woman’s constitutional right to a previability abortion and holding that states only 
have a compelling interest in potential human life, thus allowing them to restrict or prohibit 
abortion only after viability); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 503 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“retaining 
and once again reaffirm[ing]” the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade”).  The Court also noted that 
“it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government 
interference are personal decisions ‘relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education.’”  Id. at 2811 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977)); see also Lifchez v. Hartigan, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), 
aff’g 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting that if the right to privacy includes the 
right to avoid reproduction, it should also include “the right to submit to a medical procedure that 
may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy”); Jean E. Chambers, Women’s Right to Choose 
Rationally: Genetic Information, Embryo Selection, and Genetic Manipulation, 12 CAMBRIDGE 
Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 418, 419–20 (2003) (assuming that if a woman has the right to abort 
a pregnancy for any reason, then she trivially has “a derivative right to abort any specific 
pregnancy for any specific reason”).  Chambers states: 
This right suggests a corally de facto right to refuse to implant any particular candidate 
embryo, given that it would be futile and unnecessary costly to implant an embryo that 
would be aborted later.  Implantation of some embryo or other is not mandatory, because 
reproduction is not mandatory . . . [t]hus the candidate embryos are effectively at the 
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Robertson suggests that the freedom to procreate involves the freedom to 
engage in actions that result in reproduction and usually in child rearing.226  
The primacy of procreation is not limitless, but the standard for limiting the 
right is presumed to be high.227 
If a right to procreate exists, it has been suggested to be grounded in the 
right to privacy.228  Yet, the Court has never defined precisely what privacy 
protects.229  Robertson acknowledges that explicit law concerning the right to 
procreate is lacking, but references dicta in Supreme Court decisions to suggest 
that the right does, in fact, exist.230  Robertson also believes that if the moral 
right to reproduce presumptively protects coital reproduction, then it should 
also protect noncoital reproduction.231  He states that, “if bearing, begetting, or 
parenting children is protected as part of personal privacy or liberty, those 
experiences should be protected whether they are achieved coitally or 
 
women’s disposal.  It would be morally permissible for her to refuse to implant any of 
them. 
Id.; see also June Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional 
Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1365 (1996) 
(stating that “[t]he right to procreative freedom also justifies preimplantation diagnostic testing, 
fitting squarely within the fundamental rights outlined in the abortion cases because of this 
procedure’s connection to reproduction through in vitro fertilization”). 
 226. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 30. 
 227. Id. at 30 (stating that the two-step analysis is “whether a distinctively procreative interest 
is involved” and if so, “whether the harm threatened by reproduction satisfies the strict standard 
for overriding this liberty interest”). 
 228. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1998) (noting that “[i]f the Constitution guarantees a right of 
procreation, such a guarantee must fall within the ambit of the amorphous right to privacy”); see 
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters 
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973) (“[T]he constitutionally protected privacy of 
family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a 
particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship.”). 
 229. See Rao, supra note 228, at 1102–03.  Privacy protects only those personal rights that are 
deemed fundamental in the concept of ordered liberty.  See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 65.  
Conduct between two “consenting adults” does not automatically give rise to constitutional 
protection.  See id. at 68. 
 230. See generally ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 35–38 (identifying 
the strongest precedent to be dicta in Skinner v. Oklahoma).  In Skinner, the Court stated that 
marriage and procreation were among “the basic civil rights of man” and “are fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”  316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 231. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 32 (noting that “[t]he moral right 
of the coitally infertile to reproduce is based on the same desire for offspring that the coitally 
fertile have”).  Robertson also notes, however, that the major question is whether the technology 
used truly implicates reproductive interests, making this a common problem arising with 
technologies that select offspring characteristics.  See id. at 32–33. 
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noncoitally . . . with the state having the burden of showing severe harm if the 
practice is unrestricted.”232 
2. Does Procreative Liberty Protect All Uses of PGD? 
Robertson imposes relatively few limits on procreative liberty.  He goes so 
far as to argue that quality control devices, such as genetic screening or 
selective abortion, become part of the liberty interest in procreating or avoiding 
procreation and thus should receive the same degree of protection.233  
However, Robertson does realize that practices such as non-therapeutic 
enhancement “may so deviate from the core interests that make reproduction 
meaningful as to fall outside the protective canopy of procreative liberty.”234 
Although Robertson’s Children of Choice was published six years before 
the Nash family ever used PGD to conceive baby Adam to serve as a tissue 
match, Robertson discussed whether having a child to serve as a tissue donor 
for an existing child was within the protective realm of procreative liberty.  He 
concluded that conceiving a child to be a marrow donor is not any worse than 
the myriad other reasons for which children are sought.235  Even if an actual 
bone marrow transplant is required instead of merely cord blood, the risks and 
burdens to the donor child fit within the range of parental discretion over a 
 
 232. Id. at 39; see also John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproduction and the Family, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 914 (1996) (stating that “laws that restrict or prohibit access to ARTs should 
be judged under the same exacting standard that would apply to direct restrictions on coital 
reproduction—the need to show a compelling state interest not achievable by less restrictive 
means”) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., concurring)).  
A state’s power to ban ARTs is greatly limited, but it can implement “regulatory measures that 
guide and discourage, rather than coerce and prohibit.  There is . . . room for regulatory efforts 
that aim to enhance and protect autonomy, rather than to restrict it totally.”  Id. at 915. 
 233. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 33 (noting that often a couple’s 
decision to reproduce is dependent on the ability to have healthy children); see also Robertson, 
Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, supra note 216, at 426–27 (stating that if the 
decision to reproduce is a fundamental right, then a large measure of prebirth control over 
offspring traits and characteristics should follow).  Robertson reasoned: 
If a person would choose not to reproduce if she knew that the child would have a 
disability or some other undesired characteristic, then she should be entitled to have that 
information and act on it.  Her right to avoid reproduction for any reason would entitle her 
to avoid reproduction for a particular reason.  Similarly, her right to have offspring 
generally should entitle her to have offspring only if she thinks that offspring will have 
particular characteristics. 
Id. at 427. 
 234. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 34.  Robertson states that there 
may be disagreement as to where the deviation point is, but it will not easily exclude most 
reproductive technologies.  Id. at 41. 
 235. Id. at 215. 
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child.236  As long as the parents will act for the best interests of the donor child 
once it is born, their motives for having the child should not matter.237 
When considering selection of offspring characteristics, Robertson 
believes that prenatal interventions to cure disease or defect at the fetal or 
embryo level should be permitted.238  Seeking to have children is an important 
aspect of procreative liberty, and thus therapeutic actions designed to prevent 
serious disease or defect in expected offspring are part of that liberty.239 
Robertson correctly notes that a more difficult question is embryo selection 
for less serious conditions, for susceptibility traits, and for gender.240  
Robertson seems inclined to allow such screening, as he notes that because the 
embryo is so rudimentary in development, selection of embryos for these 
reasons is less objectionable than screening fetuses for those reasons.241 
3. Right of Parental Discretion When Caring for Children 
Robertson also recognizes that parents have broad parental discretion in 
rearing offspring once they are born, which makes it difficult to argue that 
PGD should be excluded from parental choice.242  The Court has long 
recognized that parents’ interest in rearing their children according to their own 
preferences is constitutionally protected,243  but has also realized that parental 
 
 236. Id. at 215–16 (recognizing that parents are ordinarily free to have minor children serve as 
donors to ill siblings). 
 237. Id. at 217. 
 238. Id. at 151 (noting that the perceived dangers of these types of quality control appear to be 
insufficient to justify removing these choices from the discretion of couples planning to 
reproduce). 
 239. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 161. 
 240. Id. at 156.  At the time of his writing, 1994, it was not yet possible to screen embryos for 
most or all of those reasons, so Robertson was merely speculating on the possibility that this 
might eventually be possible.  As stated in Part II, it is now possible to test for each of those 
reasons. 
 241. Id.  It is again important to notice the timing of these comments.  Robertson speculates 
that “[e]ven gender selection might be acceptable at this stage because the expense and burdens of 
the practice make it unlikely that this technique would ever be so widespread as to alter societal 
sex ratios—a main concern with gender selection.”  Id. (emphasis added).  As mentioned above in 
Parts II and III, gender selection has become a reality.  In his book, Robertson also discusses the 
concern of the “slippery slope,” but feels that “the fear that something will occur in the future is 
rarely a sufficient reason to stop an otherwise acceptable action from occurring.”  Id.  What 
Robertson alluded to as “fears” in 1994 have in fact become reality. 
 242. Id. at 164; see also Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, supra note 
216, at 436–37 (stating that if states cannot show that enhancement activities harm the child, then 
prebirth enhancement may receive protection as part of the right to rear children, even if it were 
not independently protected by procreative liberty). 
 243. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that a state law that 
required attendance at public schools violated parents’ liberty interest in directing the upbringing 
of their children). 
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rights are not limitless.244  Robertson does recognize that any type of genetic 
enhancement may likely have a far greater impact on offspring than any 
parental efforts made after the child was born, but feels that the potential 
“slippery slope” argument should not deny parents the right to alter embryos 
for therapeutic purposes.245  As long as the intervention is safe and likely to 
benefit offspring, it is no more likely to objectify or commodify offspring than 
postnatal enhancement efforts already do.246  The acceptability of prenatal 
enhancement may depend on the risks and benefits when compared to 
postnatal enhancement, and not on “procreative liberty per se.”247 
B. The “Rights” to Procreate and to Parental Discretion Are Not Broad 
Enough to Justify the Use of PGD for Non-Therapeutic Reasons 
1. The Scope of the Right to Privacy Is Much Narrower 
Commentators are willing to accept that a married couple’s choice to 
reproduce by sexual intercourse warrants constitutional protection under 
current privacy doctrine.248  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
in privacy and abortion cases establishes the right not to procreate.249  It is less 
clear, however, whether the right of privacy also extends to reproduction 
without sexual intercourse, and the courts have rarely addressed the 
constitutionality of restrictions on techniques of assisted reproduction.250  The 
 
 244. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (holding that the state can limit 
parental freedom if the child’s welfare is affected, regardless of whether the parents’ decisions are 
based on religious grounds). 
 245. See ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 164. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 167. 
 248. See Rao, supra note 228, at 1096 (noting that the case of Griswold v. Connecticut 
suggests, but does not expressly affirm, that sexual reproduction falls within the scope of marital 
privacy).  See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 249. See generally supra note 225.  See also Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A 
Constitutional Law Response to Professor John A. Robertson’s Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 135, 148 (1995) (referencing, among other decisions, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and 
Roe).  It should be noted that Robertson’s book was the subject of a symposium at Washington & 
Lee University School of Law in 1995.  For a wide range of critiques of his work, and for 
Robertson’s response, see Lindsay King, Introduction, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 133 (1995).  See 
also Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
265, 285 (2003).  “[W]omen have a right to decide whether they wish to remain pregnant at all; 
they might not have the right to decide whether they wish to remain pregnant with a specific 
fetus.”  Id. at 285.  Similarly, women may not have a right to decide which specific embryo to 
implant for non-therapeutic reasons. 
 250. Rao, supra note 228, at 1081–82; see also Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating 
Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 45 (2000) (noting that the right to make 
reproductive decisions “includes the right of an infertile couple to utilize medically assisted 
reproduction,” but “[h]ow far this right extends or what limits can be imposed on this right are 
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Court has not had an opportunity to discuss whether parents have a 
fundamental right to choose the traits of their children.251 
The social dimension of the right to privacy has not been recognized, but 
“[p]rivacy does not simply guarantee individuals the right to sexual, 
reproductive, and parental autonomy.  It protects the relationships between 
people that develop in the course of these activities, rather than the individual’s 
solo right to engage in such activities.”252  Within these close personal 
relationships, “privacy secures the freedom to conduct intimate and consensual 
associations, while the rights of bodily integrity and equal protection work 
together to afford constitutional protection to particular acts involved in 
procreation.”253 
Privacy cases in support of procreative liberty do not extend so far as to 
protect all possible behaviors relating to the choice of whether “to bear or 
beget a child.”254  Couples wishing to conceive using ART need access to the 
technology and thus have more specific interests than just the right to 
procreate.  All methods of assisted reproduction may not be protected by 
procreative liberty because, unlike coital reproduction, they do not directly 
implicate the values that are pertinent to the privacy cases, such as “bodily 
integrity, marital intimacy, or integrity of the family unit.”255  Furthermore, 
Robertson’s reliance on Skinner v. Oklahoma256 as the sole precedent 
supporting the constitutional right to procreate has faced criticism and 
skepticism.  The Skinner holding may rest “upon the constitutional right to 
privacy of a person, which prohibits state intrusions upon bodily integrity.”257  
 
continually being debated” and disputes exist about what activities constitute protected 
reproduction). 
 251. Skylar A. Sherwood, Note, Don’t Hate me Because I’m Beautiful . . . and 
Intelligent . . . and Athletic: Constitutional Issues in Genetic Enhancement and the Appropriate 
Legal Analysis, 11 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF LAW-MEDICINE 633, 639–40 (2001) (stating that 
“[c]hoosing to genetically engineer one’s child involves the question of whether there is a right to 
genetically enhance, not whether one will have a child”). 
 252. Rao, supra note 228, at 1103.  It is incorrect “to equate privacy with a general 
constitutional right to engage in any or all . . . important activities free from governmental 
interference.”  Id. at 1078. 
 253. Id. at 1113–14 (citation omitted).  For Rao’s complete discussion on this point, see id. at 
1101–13.  Relational privacy encompasses a couple’s right to combine their own gametes with 
the assistance of reproductive technologies, including the use of IVF.  Id. at 1116–17. 
 254. See Massie, supra note 249, at 159 (noting that cases defining constitutionally protected 
conduct implicate the values of bodily integrity and social concerns, such as the privacy of 
marital intimacy and the integrity of the family unit, in addition to the values of self-fulfillment 
and self-definition emphasized by Robertson); see also Botkin, supra note 249, at 285 (stating 
that privacy rights cannot be used to compel the provision of genetic information, even if the 
information will be used in a private matter). 
 255. Massie, supra note 249, at 162. 
 256. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 257. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1484–85 (1995). 
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Under this rationale, Skinner would only protect the right to refuse abortion 
and carry a coital pregnancy to term and the right to resist compulsory 
contraception or sterilization.258  Therefore, it is “not at all clear that Skinner 
extends constitutional protection to noncoital methods of reproduction, such as 
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.”259 
Finally, although the decision to procreate is a very important one, the 
Court has made it clear that not all deeply personal choices receive 
constitutional protection.260  In Washington v. Glucksberg,261 the Court held 
that the right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.262  This case shows that people 
do not have an unlimited right to do with their bodies as they please and that 
the right to privacy in obtaining medical treatment may be limited by state 
interests. 
2. Procreative Liberty and Parental Discretion Are Not Limitless Rights 
Laws regulating any ART, especially PGD, develop slowly and may 
appear inadequate.263  The value given to procreative liberty is at least a partial 
 
 258. Id. at 1485. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding a state law prohibiting 
assisted suicide). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 735.  The Court observed that the Due Process Clause protects the fundamental 
rights and liberties that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”  Id. at 720–21.  
Substantive due process cases require a ‘“careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.  Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial ‘guideposts 
for responsible decisionmaking.’”  Id. at 721 (citations omitted).  Because PGD is still a relatively 
recent development, the Court would probably not find a fundamental right for individuals to use 
it in any way.  If this were allowed, it would essentially recognize a right to create a child.  See 
Shawn E. Peterson, A Comprehensive National Policy to Stop Human Cloning: An Analysis of the 
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 with Recommendations for Federal and State 
Legislatures, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 217, 240 (2003) (making a similar 
argument with human cloning). 
 263. Hecht, supra note 221, at 252–53, 256 (noting that this indicates that society is 
concerned about how, and if, such regulations should occur.  Some medical societies and 
associations have published guidelines, but physician adherence is voluntary.  Additionally, any 
current federal regulations regarding fetal experimentation and research do not cover the private 
sector.); see also Andrews & Elster, supra note 250, at 44 (noting that the United States “lacks an 
adequate structural mechanism for assessing genetic and reproductive technologies” and that 
several groups have begun to address this, such as the New York State Task Force on Life and the 
Law, the Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics Committee of the American Bar 
Association, and the Institute for Science, Law, and Technology’s Working Group on 
Reproductive Technologies); Malinowski, supra note 61, at 221 (commenting that the field of 
ARTs “has burgeoned into a major commercial and medical presence largely without the restraint 
of controlling regulatory checks”). 
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explanation for the lack of regulatory oversight in the field of ART.264  But the 
premium placed on procreative liberty may be mistaken and, regardless, must 
be tempered by social reflection, as “[t]raditional medical ethics . . . has relied 
on principles other than utility in determining what is and is not ethically 
appropriate in the practice of medicine in the research and therapeutic 
settings . . . .”265  “[T]he decision about whether or not to procreate is most 
strongly attached to the decision about whether or not to become a parent.”266  
Although parents are generally free to decide how to rear their children,267 
there is an absence of case law that addresses parental rights in terms of 
“unnecessary treatments, therapies, or surgeries.”268  With this in mind, it is 
possible to speculate that the Court might extend a right to procreate to at least 
some forms of ARTs, but it is doubtful that this right would extend to all 
medical procedures resulting in a child’s birth.269 
In Robertson’s broad view of procreative liberty, “because a person may 
abort an embryo for any reason, a person may prenatally select or deselect 
traits for any reason”270—but this is a faulty analogy.  A right not to procreate 
does not translate into a right to customize offspring.  In Roe v. Wade,271 the 
 
 264. See Malinowski, supra note 61, at 203–04 (also noting that another explanation is “the 
premium placed on autonomy in healthcare decision-making”). 
 265. Id. at 204–05 (quoting A PRIMER FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS: ESSAYS FOR A 
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 193 (Kevin O’Rourke ed., 2d ed. 2000)). 
 266. Dana Ziker, Appropriate Aims: Setting Boundaries for Reprogenetic Technology, 2002 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11, 6 (2002), at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/ 
2002dltr0011.html (stating that the interest in child rearing should be at the forefront when 
considering procreative liberty). 
 267. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 263 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 268. Sherwood, supra note 251, at 643. 
 269. Coleman, supra note 215, at 66 (noting that although ARTs require medical intervention, 
that does not mean they automatically “fall outside the scope of constitutional protection”); see 
also Rao, supra note 228, at 1115 (stating that the right to bodily integrity does not “necessarily 
‘extend[] constitutional protection to noncoital methods of reproduction’” (quoting Rao, supra 
note 257, at 1485)); Sherwood, supra note 251, at 643 (suggesting the unlikeliness that parents 
can “demand and have a right to any and every treatment for their child”); Steinbock, supra note 
9, at 186 (suggesting that factors to consider for the appropriateness of prenatal testing are impact 
on health, age of onset, probability of disease, and potential for therapy).  “The case for morally 
permissible prenatal testing is strongest where there is serious impact on health, a high probability 
of disease, non-existent or ineffective therapy, and early age of onset.”  Id.; see also Ziker, supra 
note 266, at 7 (stating that the right to procreate should be limited to protect procreative interests 
that further the important interest of child rearing).  See generally Botkin, supra note 249, at 288–
90 (identifying various organizations and commentators that believe that a “line” should be drawn 
as to what kinds of information and tests should be offered for prenatal diagnosis and which 
should not be offered and stating that most would limit testing to serious conditions and exclude 
testing for “mild” or “trivial” conditions). 
 270. See Ziker, supra note 266, at 9 (citing Robertson, supra note 216, at 427).  Ziker makes a 
legal distinction between abortion and selection by preimplantation genetic screening.  Id. at 10. 
 271. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Court considered the balance between conflicting state interests and 
determined that the parental rights at stake, such as procreative liberty, 
personal autonomy, and bodily integrity, outweighed the state’s interest in 
protecting prenatal life.272  When considering PGD, however, many of the 
parental interests at stake in abortion disappear; thus, the constitutional validity 
of the screening will depend on the parents’ interest in procreative liberty and 
the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life.273  Prenatal life arguably has 
some slight legal interests that should be balanced against the “heart of 
procreative liberty”—child rearing.274  Therefore, the Court would likely allow 
the use of reproductive technology, and thus PGD, so long as it furthers the 
parental interest of child rearing, which has been recognized as a protected 
liberty interest.275  As will be seen in the Sections below, not all uses of PGD 
further the important interest of child rearing. 
3. How the Uses of PGD Might Be Distinguished 
The Court is likely to differentiate procedures that enable individuals to 
have a child from procedures that seek to provide the means to have a 
particular child.276  PGD can be regulated because it is not as closely 
connected to the decision of whether “to bear or beget a child”—its use relates 
more directly to the type of child the couple would have.277  The right to “bear 
and beget a child” does not invoke a right to a “beautiful or talented child.”278  
Couples who want to use PGD for non-therapeutic purposes can still decide 
 
 272. See id.; see also Thomas Stuart Patterson, Note, The Outer Limits of Human Genetic 
Engineering: A Constitutional Examination of Parents’ Procreative Liberty to Genetically 
Enhance Their Offspring, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 913, 928 (1999) (noting that the interests at 
stake in Roe were also based on personal autonomy and bodily integrity, and not merely 
procreative liberty). 
 273. See Patterson, supra note 272, at 928–29.  “In the genetic engineering scenario, bodily 
integrity plays absolutely no role.  The personal autonomy of the woman will not be affected by 
inability to genetically engineer her children.  Thus, much of the rationale behind the decisions in 
Roe and Casey fails to support Robertson’s assertion.”  Id.  A similar analogy can be made for 
using PGD for non-therapeutic purposes.  Prohibiting couples from using PGD for arbitrary 
purposes will not affect their personal autonomy. 
 274. Ziker, supra note 266, at 12–13 (recognizing that criminal law and inheritance law 
identify the interests of even a pre-viable fetus). 
 275. Id. at 14.  See generally Savulescu, supra note 197. 
 276. Coleman, supra note 215, at 66. 
 277. Vicki G. Norton, Comment, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation 
Genetic Screening and Proposed Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1628 (1994). 
 278. Id. at 1629; see also Andrews & Elster, supra note 250, at 62 (“Even though parents 
have a constitutional right to make child rearing decisions similar to their constitutional right to 
make childbearing decisions, parents do not have a right to receive genetic information about 
their children that is not of immediate medical benefit.”). 
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whether or not to have a child even if the technology was not available.279  
Thus, parents attempting to use PGD for non-therapeutic reasons are trying to 
invoke more than their interest in the right to procreation.280  When considering 
restricting trait selection technologies, the Court is “likely to ask whether such 
restrictions are substantial limitations for the average person seeking to have a 
child, not whether they interfere with the willingness of particular persons to 
reproduce.”281 
Under this narrower view of procreative liberty, the right to procreate 
would only protect using PGD for traits that substantially affect the 
responsibilities associated with child rearing.282  Clearly, a couple that seeks to 
prevent offspring with a severe genetic disease should be allowed access to 
PGD.283  Using PGD for sex selection should be prohibited because the gender 
of a child does not substantially affect child rearing responsibilities.284 
Screening for non-medical or non-therapeutic traits does not substantially 
affect child rearing responsibilities and thus should not be allowed.  In general, 
“[a]voiding serious [genetic] diseases constitutes a compelling objective for 
[PGD]. Pursuit of the perfect baby through nontherapeutic genetic 
enhancement does not.”285  Although most parental decisions are viewed with 
great deference,286 PGD can allow parents to determine their children’s gender 
and other characteristics, which clearly plays an influential and perhaps even 
permanent role in their overall development.  Such decisions should not be 
 
 279. Norton, supra note 277, at 1628–29 (noting that the denial of access to PGD would only 
“seriously affect” the bodily integrity and personal autonomy of the at-risk couple and that 
denying such access to healthy and nonfertile couples would only affect their bodily integrity by 
creating disappointment if they wanted to select their children’s traits); see also Coleman, supra 
note 215, at 66 (stating that even if Robertson’s notion that restrictions on trait selection would 
affect some couples’ willingness to have children, “the Court is unlikely to find that such indirect 
burdens on procreative decisions are constitutionally significant”). 
 280. See Norton, supra note 277, at 1621–22 (suggesting that the Court is likely to find a right 
to affirmative procreation, and possibly even IVF, but less likely to find a separate liberty to use 
preimplantation genetic screening, a technology that is even more specific than IVF).  For a 
complete examination of a couple’s interests in using IVF, see id. at 1624–28. 
 281. Coleman, supra note 215, at 67. 
 282. Ziker, supra note 266, at 19 (acknowledging that the “substantially affects” component 
of the test is difficult and uncertain).  Ziker concludes that at times the test will require subjective 
judgment because it is not a bright-line test.  Id.  “Nevertheless, drawing a line that becomes 
blurred in borderline cases should not deter courts from drawing the line at all.”  Id. 
 283. Screening for late-onset genetic diseases and susceptibility traits would arguably not be 
allowed, as the extra responsibilities do not arise until later in life.  But, some might allow PGD 
for these disorders by arguing that child rearing responsibilities are indefinite.  For more 
discussion on this point, see Ziker, supra note 266, at 20–21. 
 284. Screening for sex-linked diseases has not been addressed in this Comment but could 
arguably be permitted. 
 285. See Ziker, supra note 266, at 23. 
 286. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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given deference—public policy and the “best interests of the child” demand 
that parents’ rights be limited in this area.287 
Legislation for any ART, including PGD, must be realistic and rational, 
instead of merely attempting to suppress a controversial technology.288  New 
technologies should be introduced cautiously, as a prudent approach will 
ensure that it is not abused.289  The potential danger of non-therapeutic uses of 
PGD has warranted the regulation of the technology. 
C. Regulation of PGD is Necessary from a Public Policy Perspective 
Although procreative liberty is arguably not broad enough to allow a 
couple to use PGD for any purpose, there are nevertheless strong reasons for 
regulating it from a public policy perspective.  Present scientific and cultural 
trends support the assumption that prospective parents will use PGD to the 
fullest extent that their financial resources allow.290  Thus, legislation must be 
enacted to regulate PGD based on the parental intent for the procedure, thereby 
preventing “the development of a full-blown free market genetic catalogue that 
is available only to those who can afford it.”291 
 
 287. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (recognizing that the state can 
exercise its legitimate interests of protecting the physical, emotional, and mental welfare of a 
minor child and the best interests of the community). 
 288. Hecht, supra note 221, at 235 (suggesting that previous legislation regarding 
reproduction issues was “motivated by an aversion to the ‘nightmarish and decidedly unnatural 
perversion of human reproduction’” (citation omitted)); see also Norton, supra note 277, at 1642 
(noting that there must be a “rational relationship between the ban [on non-therapeutic 
preimplantation genetic screening] and a legitimate state interest”).  State and society interests are 
discussed infra Part IV.C.1. 
 289. See John A. Robertson, Preconception Gender Selection, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 7 (Jan. 
2001) (recognizing that, in terms of sex selection, a desired policy would restrict the practice to 
offspring gender variety until further debate and analysis of the issues occurs, as opposed to 
making the technology immediately available to anyone desiring it), at 
http://juno.ingentaselect.com/vl=7391710/cl=52/nw=1/fm=docpdf/rpsv/cw/mitpress/15265161/v1
n1/s2/p2. 
 290. Malinowski, supra note 61, at 205 (noting the example of upper and middle-class 
families to get their children into the “right” preschools and elementary schools in order to give 
them early advantages).  But see Robertson, supra note 216, at 452 (stating that because “there 
are probably few fertile couples who would go through IVF and PGD just to select offspring 
genetic characteristics” and because the costs of PGD are likely to deter most couples who are 
otherwise undergoing IVF from also seeking gender selection, PGD is unlikely to affect gender 
role ratios, cause discrimination to women or people with disabilities, or lead to other 
consequences).  This notion is dated, as information stated earlier shows that couples have begun 
to use PGD solely for sex selection.  See supra Part II.D.3. 
 291. Karen E. Adams, Ethical Considerations of Applications of Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis in the United States, 22 MED. & L. 489, 494 (2003); see Hecht, supra note 221, at 256 
(suggesting that “[w]ithout legal guidance on fetal screening, genetic enhancement may ‘evolve’ 
unchecked into a New Age eugenics movement where only the strongest and smartest babies are 
brought into the world”); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 18, at 208 (noting that preimplantation 
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Drafting legislation regulating the therapeutic uses of PGD will prevent 
children from being viewed as commodities, which will likely occur if parents 
select desired, but non-therapeutic, traits.292  It is troubling to think that the 
only way some couples would conceive is if they could have a child of a 
particular gender or with a particular physical or performance trait.293  While 
family balancing is an understandable desire among couples who want to use 
PGD solely for sex selection, they should want to nurture and rear a child, not 
a boy or a girl.  It is especially troubling to consider that some couples would 
spend the necessary thousands of dollars for the procedure to create their first 
child.  Because parents now have the opportunity to permanently affect an 
aspect of a child’s life, it would be cautious and wise to limit this authority to 
therapeutic uses.  Such an approach would still grant parents the deference to 
make medical decisions on behalf of their children.294  Furthermore, legislation 
that only allows the therapeutic uses of PGD will aid society’s interest in 
preventing harm to at-risk families by minimizing the significant emotional, 
physical, and financial burdens they could endure.   
The interests of couples wishing to control genetics during their 
procreation must be tempered against the broader interests of society.295  PGD 
raises the issue of negative versus positive eugenics.296  Most people might 
 
diagnosis and screening does not need to be banned, but rather should be regulated by 
distinguishing between therapy and enhancement).  “This general principle would allow us to use 
biotechnologies to, for example, cure genetic diseases like Huntington’s[,] chorea[,] or cystic 
fibrosis, but not to make our children more intelligent or taller.”  Id. at 208–09.  In cases where it 
is hard to make those distinctions, regulatory agencies should be able to make them.  Id. at 209–
10. 
 292. See supra notes 84–140 and accompanying text. 
 293. Although the findings from the Australian survey discussed in Part IV.C. indicate that 
females might not be as oppressed by sex selection as some commentators have speculated, the 
potential for such a problem is still frequently discussed in the literature.  See, e.g., Sonia Mateu 
Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 269 (2002) (noting that as 
it becomes more possible to select or alter traits without pregnancy termination, the pressure to 
select desirable traits will increase and that “[i]n gaining the choice to control the quality of our 
children, we may rapidly lose the choice not to control the quality, the choice of simply accepting 
them as they are” (citation omitted)). 
 294. Sherwood, supra note 251, at 644. 
 295. PAUL, supra note 93, at 135. 
Indeed, if we insist on absolute reproductive autonomy we must accept the use of genetic 
technologies to prevent the birth of those who are unwanted for any reason: that they will 
be the “wrong” gender, or sexual orientation, or of short statute, or prone to obesity, 
or . . . . Used this way, medical genetics will surely reinforce a host of social prejudices.  
A history of eugenics that is sensitive to its complexities alerts us to the fact that genetic 
technologies present more than one kind of danger—and that if we are not very careful, 
we may avoid one only to court another. 
Id. 
 296. Chambers, supra note 225, at 418 (describing “negative eugenics” as the elimination of 
diseases or defects and “positive eugenics” as the enhancement of traits); see also FUKUYAMA, 
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consider PGD to be positive eugenics (or genetic enhancement), but any form 
of embryo selection could arguably involve both positive and negative eugenic 
decisions.297  As noted, a potential fear is that if PGD was widely available, it 
would exacerbate class differences, as couples with money and inclination 
would give their offspring further advantages that others did not have.298  PGD 
could also decrease genetic diversity—as certain traits become popular, parents 
will select them and the pool of overall genetic traits might begin to 
decrease.299  Similarly, the government might also have an interest in 
preventing discrimination against pre-embryos.300  PGD and other genetic 
enhancement technologies may also alter family relationships and dynamics.  
A primary concern is the risk that the child will be viewed as a “product or 
commodity engineered to satisfy parents.”301  Children may suffer 
 
supra note 18, at 85–87 (discussing eugenics in the United States and the West); Wilder, supra 
note 101, at 203. 
Arguably, assisted reproduction is a method of eugenics, pure and simple.  The demand 
for assisted reproduction exists because people want to have, raise, and be succeeded by, 
children with a genetic make-up that is viewed by them as more desirable than that which 
would be possessed by another child. 
Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that the “laissez-faire approach currently 
practiced in the United States—while allowing for individual agendas of reproductive choice 
based on religion, culture, philosophy, and wealth—leaves open the door to eugenic practices, 
and could ultimately exacerbate the rift between the affluent and the underprivileged”). 
 297. Chambers, supra note 225, at 418 (noting that even the elimination of embryos with 
devastating defects involves both types of eugenic decisions because “to say no to one embryo is, 
in most situations, to say yes to another, thereby favoring the ‘better’ embryo, a positive eugenic 
decision.”).  See generally King, supra note 41. 
 298. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 166 (noting that this would 
“creat[e] more unfairness than the natural lottery already creates”); see also Norton, supra note 
277, at 1611 (noting that the ability to screen more embryos could accelerate the formation of a 
“genetically elite class”).  See generally Mehlman & Rabe, supra note 58, at 182–83 (suggesting 
that genetic enhancement compromises fairness because not all members of society have equal 
access to the technologies and those that are genetically enhanced may have unfair advantages 
over the un-enhanced members and that such technologies also threaten democracy and harm 
society’s respect “for the value of humanity and the genetic heritage of mankind”). 
 299. See Norton, supra note 277, at 1613; see also Mehlman & Rabe, supra note 58, at 184 
(“There is also a fear that [genetic enhancement] may change the genetic pool of the human 
race.”). 
 300. See Norton, supra note 277, at 1644 (suggesting that “the state interest in the equal 
treatment of the early pre-embryo would be subordinate to the rights of a born person”). 
 301. ROBERTSON: CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 219, at 160; see also Ziker, supra note 
266, at 15–16 (noting that prenatal genetic screening is much different from post-natal molding of 
offspring because the former leaves a permanent mark on offspring); FUKUYAMA, supra note 18, 
at 93–94 (recognizing the argument that parents can make decisions on behalf of their children, 
but noting that these children who are reared in a certain way can rebel later and pointing out that 
genetic modification, on the other hand, “is more like giving your child a tattoo that she can never 
subsequently remove and will have to hand down not just to her own children but to all 
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psychological harm knowing that they were designed and manufactured.302  As 
previously mentioned, the concern is that the children would experience 
enormous pressure in trying to meet their parents’ expectations and would be 
unable to devise their own preferences.  This could result in “conditional 
parenting,” in which children live out the possible self-serving preferences of 
their parents.303  Similarly, society’s expectations of parental responsibility 
might shift so that “good parents” are expected to give their children the right 
genes and traits.304 
D. Who Should Regulate PGD? 
In March 2004, The President’s Council on Bioethics issued a report 
entitled Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation of New 
Biotechnologies.305  The report included the findings of “a comprehensive 
inquiry into the current regulation of [the] biotechnologies that touch on human 
reproduction.”306  Interestingly, the Council noted that: 
[t]he Council finds that our regulatory institutions have not kept pace with our 
rapid technological advance.  Indeed, there is today no public authority 
responsible for monitoring or overseeing how these technologies make their 
way from the experimental to the clinical stage, from novel approach to 
widespread practice.  There is no authority, public or private, that monitors 
how or to what extent these new technologies are being or will be used, or that 
is responsible for attending to the ways they affect the health and well-being of 
the participants or the character of human reproduction more generally.  Our 
existing regulatory institutions, such as the Food and Drug Administration or 
local institutional review boards, do not at the present time oversee this area, 
and the welcome ethical standards promulgated by the professional societies 
are somewhat limited in scope and not binding on individual member 
practitioners.  Yet the Council has refrained, at least for the time being, from 
proposing major new regulatory institutions.  Gaps in our current information 
 
subsequent descendants”); Steinbock, supra note 9, at 185 (briefly discussing the views of some 
commentators about the potential commodification and objectification of children). 
 302. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on 
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 653–54 (1998) (suggesting such effects on cloned 
children); see also Mehlman & Rabe, supra note 58, at 184 (speculating whether children would 
reproach parents for making bad decisions on their behalf). 
 303. Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Project and the 
Commodification of Self, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 158 (1998). 
 304. Mehlman & Rabe, supra note 58, at 184. 
 305. The President’s Council on Bioethics, Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation 
of New Biotechnologies (Mar. 2004), at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionand 
responsibility/_pcbe_final_reproduction_and_responsibility.pdf [hereinafter Reproduction and 
Responsibility]. 
 306. Id. at xvii. 
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make doing so premature, and our deep differences over the moral status of 
human embryos make it problematic.307 
Although the Council correctly recognized that American regulatory 
institutions are lagging in this area, its decision to postpone proposing new 
institutions is unacceptable.  The combination of ART and the genetics 
revolution requires the government to assume a “more meaningful role.”308  
PGD demands particular attention.  The Council’s recommendation to 
“[r]equire more specific reporting and publication of the frequency of, and 
reasons for, uses of . . . [PGD]” is not enough.309  The government must enact 
legislation as a prerequisite to establishing institutions with legitimate 
enforcement powers, as England has done.310  The legislation should create 
“sufficient regulatory jurisdiction over this technology implemented by those 
with scientific expertise, who should become directly engaged in ART through 
the dynamism of ongoing regulation reflective of the changing nature of the 
underlying science and public opinion.”311  Ideally, a new regulatory agency 
similar to the HFEA in England would be created.  This agency should focus 
exclusively on PGD and other reproductive technologies.  This organization 
will undoubtedly take some time to establish, so one suggestion in the 
 
 307. Id. (emphasis added). 
 308. Malinowski, supra note 61, at 214; Wilder, supra note 101, at 203 (suggesting that state 
regulation of the medical practice of assisted reproduction “be limited to ensuring safe and ethical 
practices, without attempting to influence the character of the genome itself,” but recognizing 
“the distinction is not always an easy, or even possible, one”).  But see Botkin, supra note 249, at 
265–66 (proposing medical professional standards as a desired alternative to government 
regulation of assisted reproduction).  For a discussion of the pros and cons of a number of 
possible options for regulating PGD, including federal, state, and non-governmental approaches, 
see A Discussion of Challenges, supra note 36, at 11–17. 
 309. Reproduction and Responsibility, supra note 305, at xlvi. 
 310. Malinowski, supra note 61, at 216; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 18, at 203–04 
(noting that it is no longer enough for the government to appoint national commissions to deal 
with biotechnology questions and that “it is time to move from thinking to acting, from 
recommending to legislating.  We need institutions with real enforcement powers.”).  But see 
generally John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697, 
715–18 (1990) (discussing potential roles of the United States government and suggesting that 
they be negative or noninterfering.  The government has a duty is to refrain “from barring persons 
from obtaining and making use of genetic information in reproduction.”  The government also 
has a regulatory role to protect consumers of genetic information by assuring them that the 
information is provided by competent professionals.  Another governmental role is to provide 
access to genetic services to those people who lack the resources or knowledge to obtain it 
themselves.). 
 311. Malinowski, supra note 61, at 216 (suggesting that if people with technical scientific 
expertise were given the authority, it may also be possible to draw distinctions between therapy 
and enhancement, with greater restraints imposed on enhancement). 
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meantime is to expand the role of the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”).312 
The federal government has been slow to respond to this new technology, 
and the report issued by The President’s Council on Bioethics will 
unfortunately not prompt major action anytime soon.  Because it appears that 
the federal government is likely to continue its position of no regulation over 
PGD and other ARTs, the individual state governments should become 
involved in this process and impose regulations.  Even Robertson 
acknowledges that both state and private actors can “express their own moral 
views about reproductive choice” or “take steps to minimize perceived 
harm.”313  The state can deny funding to ART procedures or refuse to provide 
the required legal infrastructure to make efficient use of the procedures.314  If 
the state does decide to allow certain forms of ART, it should certify and 
license laboratories and providers.315  Federal regulation would be more ideal 
because of its uniformity and as shown could arguably withstand constitutional 
challenge, but given the federal government’s prior reluctance to get involved 
in this arena, the states should, at a minimum, implement some of the 
discussed regulations. 
Finally, if both federal and state governments refuse to get involved, the 
private associations that accredit and inspect the fertility clinics should attempt 
to authorize certain uses of PGD.  These associations should follow the 
guidelines issued by the ASRM, assuming that Congress does act to authorize 
a new agency to oversee PGD.  It would be in society’s best interest to take 
some sort of action to prohibit couples from using PGD in any manner they 
choose. 
 
 312. Id. at 218 (suggesting that the FDA’s definition of tissue products regulated as biologics 
should be expanded to include the manipulation of sex cells in any manner, manipulation through 
hormone therapy, or the creation of embryos as tissue products).  Id. at 219; see also Mehlman & 
Rabe, supra note 58, at 190–92 (suggesting several different agencies and ways that the 
government could regulate genetic enhancement, including the FDA); A Discussion of 
Challenges, supra note 36, at 7–9 (identifying the CDC, FDA, and Center for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services as agencies that currently oversee areas relating to PGD).  But see 
FUKUYAMA, supra note 18, at 212–15 (suggesting that existing institutions, including the FDA, 
may not be able to assume such a role and that a new agency is needed instead). 
 313. Robertson, supra note 232, at 915 (suggesting that doctors can opt not to perform certain 
procedures and impose limits on procedures they are willing to perform).  But see A Discussion of 
Challenges, supra note 36, at 9 (discussing how no state has enacted a law that directly addresses 
PGD and that most states have not assumed oversight responsibilities for fertility clinics).  This 
report identifies the pros and cons of a number of proposed policy options.  See id. at 11–17. 
 314. Robertson, supra note 232, at 915; see also A Discussion of Challenges, supra note 36, 
at 9 (suggesting that states can influence access to PGD by mandating insurance coverage). 
 315. Robertson, supra note 232, at 915; see also id. at 919 (stating that “any doctor can 
provide infertility services without any specific certification if he or she attracts patients and has 
access to surgical suites for egg retrieval”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
PGD is a powerful and controversial technology that has revolutionized 
genetic testing and assisted reproduction while helping families worldwide.  
The scope and uses of PGD, as well as the ethical and legal issues surrounding 
it, have greatly increased since it was first developed.  As the technology 
further refines itself and our scientific understanding improves, researchers are 
likely to develop even more genetic tests that utilize PGD.  This potential 
expansion coupled with an increase in public awareness of PGD could 
certainly increase demand for the technology.  In time, couples might have the 
opportunity to choose a number of their children’s traits for arbitrary reasons, 
and the United States does not currently have any legislation to prevent this 
from occurring.  Other nations have assumed a more active role in regulating 
this technology, and the United States should as well.  The Supreme Court has 
not recognized that the rights of procreative liberty and family discretion 
extend so far as to protect all parental decisions relating to preconception 
selection.  Prior decisions relating to contraception, abortion, and family do not 
incorporate a right for couples to use assisted reproductive technologies in any 
way they please.  If no regulatory measure is taken, individuals could soon find 
themselves “liv[ing] in a society where one’s genetics become more a matter 
of choice than chance.”316  We do not want to live in a society where 
“discrimination [is] down to a science.”317  Unregulated use of PGD could 
result in serious harm to society and children, making it necessary to assume 
control over the technology and ensure that it will be used only for therapeutic 
purposes. 
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